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PREFACE 
This investigation represents a critical analysis of the educational 
thought of the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955). I wish 
to present not only his educational ideas, but also how they relate to some 
basic notions of his philosophy, (for instance, his idea of philosophy and 
of human life). I think that without an understanding of Ortega's philosophy, 
the true entailment of his educational thought could not be grasped. So, we 
will stress here basically the conceptual dimension of Ortega's educational 
thought. This will mean that large segments of his thought will be only 
briefly discussed and others will not be mentioned. 
In my exposition I want to accomplish two things. The first one will 
be divided in three parts as follows: (a) an analysis of some of Orteqa's 
basic philosophical concepts which I think relate directly to his education; 
(b) a particularized exposition and critical analysis of his educational 
ideas per se; (c) an establishment of the relationship between his philosophy 
and his pedagogy. 
My second concern for this investigation could be labeled as personal. 
I thought that this would be a good opportunity to draw a deeper and better 
understanding of this thinker, so influential in my intellectual development, 
as well as that of my fellow countrymen. I will, therefore, re-examine what 
I have conceived as strong points in this man's thought, together with his 
weak points and deficiencies. My concern is drawinq as objective a picture 
of his thought as possible. 
The thesis will consist of four chapters divided into two major parts 
of two chapters each. The first part will deal basically with some of 
Ortega's philosophical concepts, where chapter one will analyze the idea of 
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philosophy as Aletheia or search for truth. The second chapter will concern 
the treatment of the truth as found in Ortega's philosophy, i.e., the idea 
of human life, a concept which represents perhaps the most central and 
important theme in Ortega's thought. This may be easily understood because 
human life is conceived as the radical truth and a radical reality in which— 
as H. C. Raley says—"all other reality assumes meaning and structure": 
including man's education. 
In the second part, chapter three will deal with Ortega's concepts of 
the Europeanization of Spain and of his ideas and beliefs regardmq what he 
conceives should be aims of education within his Spanish circumstance. He 
maintains that Spain's basic problem is educational, but that education should 
not only be an orientation toward the clarity of ideas. This, of course, is 
a main concern in Ortega's thought, and he asks of Spain to look toward 
Europe to get this clarity by what he calls "europelzacion de Espana." He 
thinks that Europe, having contributed so much to philosophical, scientific, 
and mathematical thought—which Spain lacks—should be a good paradigm to 
follow. Nonetheless, this should not be interpreted as relinquishing the 
national beliefs rooted in the Spanish tradition and characteristic of a 
Spanish personality. Rather, he asks for a Europeanization within a Spanish 
national framework. His idea is that of "unity in variety" whereby Spain, 
as an individual nation, would be able to join the cultural community 
represented by Europe. 
After this general view of Ortega's idea of education regarding Spain's 
connection to Europe, we pass to chapter four to discuss Ortega's pedaqogy 
proper, aided by the view provided by the previous analysis. 
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Chapter four will cover basically: (a) the concept of spontaneity 
and creativity in education; (b) the idea of the student and the activity 
of studying; (c) the idea of the university as student-oriented and its 
relation to profession, culture, and research. 
As the final part of the thesis, I will present my conclusions and 
evaluations. 
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IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY AS ALETHEIA 
Following the idea that Ortega's pedagogy relates to his philosophy, 
I present in this chapter his idea of philosophy as aletheia, while 
analyzing some of i t s pedagogical implications. 
I w i l l make a systematic presentation of philosophy as aletheia 
by tracing i t through the basic writings in which i t appeared through 
1910-1951, and making a detailed exposition of i t s fundamental elements. 
Our analysis w i l l discuss the following points- philosophy as an 
educational enterprise, a brief Ortegean historical analysis of aletheia; 
aletheia as methodical revelation in Ortega; further evolution of the 
concept of aletheia as- mte r io r i t y and bringing to the "open" or 
"surface," as what is "clear" and as talking to oneself or "logos," as 
"genuine" thought and solitude; aletheia, knowledge, and education. 
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Philosophy as an Educational Enterprise 
According to Ortega, the bir th of Western philosophy in Greece, 
twenty-six centuries ago, represents the f i r s t introduction of a rational 
and methodic approach to truth in Western thought. Accordinq to our author, 
philosophy represented from i ts onset a cr i t ic ism of the unquestioned truth 
represented by tradit ion in the form of myths, legends and polytheistic 
creeds. When man follows t rad i t ion , he does not judge or rationally dis-
criminate evidence sustaining his ideas; old established opinions dominate 
his thought. This means that the individual submits his spontaneous 
conviction to the tribunal of t rad i t ion, or to what is "repeated," "said 
by people," since time immemorial. 
This submission to tradit ion was the case in the Greek society previous 
to the birth of philosophy. Tradition was "doing" the thinking for the 
individual by means of i ts treasure of myths and legends. I f this man 
were confronted by a problem or d i f f i cu l ty in his l i f e , he would react to 
i t by reiterating a communal, pre-existent, and col lect ively accepted 
formula. 
Now, how does philosophy d i f fer from this "primit ive" attitude of the 
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mind? The answer seems to be that i t opposes reason to t radi t ion. This 
means that, when a thought occurs to me, I do not base i t s truth on 
tradit ion but on "what seems evident ID me" after c r i t i ca l l y analyzing i ts 
pros and cons. For Ortega, this means that the "strength of reason is born 
of the conviction that is produced in the individual."4 So, reason 
represents for our author an "imperative" of each man's "reversion to 
himself," while tradit ion turns out as an "imperative" to "put aside our 
' I myself melding into the col lect ive."3 
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We witness here a shift of attitude in the way reason addresses 
reality. It implies two thinqs: (1) a shift of attention from the 
collective and traditional interpretation of reality to one based on the 
individual's own conviction; (2) that personal and spontaneous conviction is 
now guided by reason rather than by tradition. 
Ortega comments on this in his "prologue to a History of Philosophy" 
(1946). He says that, in order that philosophy be born, man must have lost 
"the faith of his forebearers," i.e., that man doubted the truth of his 
cherished traditions. Philosophy then is a "substitute for sheltered 
tradition." This means that the traditional beliefs in the gods and myths 
must have become worthless, leaving men "isolated" and "uprooted." The 
world of security of culture ceased to be so, and some individuals must have 
tried searching for a "new security." Thus, reason represents a movement 
to "keep afloat on the sea of doubts." The place of the "sheltered 
tradition" was taken by reason which turns to be representative of a "way," 
"methods," or "passage through the frightful straits." For Ortega, the 
belief in the gods and myths of the Greeks was substituted by a "belief" 
in reason as a method that enabled man "to discover the true reality and to 
o 
establish himself in it." 
This was precisely what the first philosophers intended to do. 
Parmenides, for instance, distinguished between reason (episteme) and 
opinion (doxa). He argued that man should look beyond the reality of 
opinion, appearances, and change for the true reality of being, fixed and 
immutable. The only true thinking is that of reason because it is in 
accord with reality. Another instance of this intent of substituting reason 
for tradition is Plato's. He, as did Parmenides, intended to show how 
wrong confusing appearances with true reality or the world of ideas was. 
4 
With respect to the belief in polytheistic creeds, he tried to prove, by 
way of reason, how wrong it was to believe that there existed more than one 
god. He rejected also the idea of an anthropocentric divinity on the basis 
that it was contradictory to a conception of the god as qood. 
So, from its onset, philosophy has always drawn an intent to distinguish 
between appearances and true reality, that is, between opinion, based on 
tradition, and reason. Nonetheless, what is most important to us for the 
purpose of our dissertation is the educational entailment of philosophy. 
In general, philosophy represented an educational enterprise. It had, 
in many respects, a deliberate intent to teach man truth, the good life; 
and many times it gave "methods" or a v/ay for it to be reached. Besides our 
examples quoted above when we mentioned Parmenides and Plato, perhaps the 
best illustration to show the educational implications of this discipline 
is Socrates. He was probably the first man in the recorded history of 
Western humanity who gave up his life to be true to reason, to truth, and 
to the ideal of the good life that he taught his disciples. 
Ortega's idea of philosophy fits perfectly along this humanistic 
tradition; that is why his philosophy and educational views are so related 
to each other. He, for instance, modified his philosophical writing style 
in such a way as to appeal to the Spanish public; he even chose to publish 
many of his important works through newspapers and popular magazines for 
the same reason. He felt committed to the education of his generation 
and that of the Spanish world. This made him "the teacher of . . . (his) . . . 
generation." 
Ortega presents his idea of philosophy as a task of searching for 
truth. He wanted to teach his Spanish people and the Spanish world how to 
search for truth; he gave it the label of "aletheia." Let us discuss this 
5 
in the following pages and analyze its educational implications. 
A Brief Ortegean Historical Analysis of Aletheia 
According to Ortega, philosophy properly started in the thought of 
Parmenides and Heraclitus. Applying reason systematically to the unveiling 
of the hidden reality as presented through myths, legends, and traditional 
thought, was labeled by Parmenides and alert groups of his epoch as aletheia. 
Parmenides discovered that certain commonly held beliefs about reality were 
false. He noticed that rational analysis could discern the reality itself 
behind those traditionally accepted beliefs which appeared to him now as a 
"crust" or "veil" concealing reality. It is this concealing "veil" of 
interpretations of rpality which had to be removed so as to allow the reality 
to "emerge unclothed, naked, and patent." This represents an activity 
"akin to undressing . . . revealing (un-veiling), deciphering an emqma or 
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hieroglyphic." This is what is meant literally as an endeavor of dis-
covery and deciphering enigmas in the process of searching for reality 
13 
itself, in searching for its truth "aletheia means truth." However, it 
is not in the sense of a truth once discovered and dogmatically repeated ever 
after; it implies, on the contrary, an "action," somethmq "alive" as viewed 
in its moment of attainment or of birth. So aletheia or truth could be 
better defined as an "inquiry," a "quest for truth," to find the concealed 
and naked reality behind the "robes of falsehood." 
Ortega thinks that finding truth or carrying out an inquiry—aletheia--
should have been philosophy's "perennial" name (as it was called in its 
initial phase) innocently, without "social precautions," when the thinker 
was alone with the reality of his new rational intellectual endeavor and 
critical of the social beliefs and traditions. But, it seems that when 
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the Athenians knew that there were men who called themselves "discoverers" 
of t ru th , they reacted with violence toward them. The Greeks s t i l l believed 
that their gods ought to be the ones to know t ru th , so, how could any man_ 
claim being a knower of truth? As soon as people knew of the existence of 
"inquirers" of t ru th , they began their assault, misinterpreting and confusing 
the "thinker's" task. This caused, for instance, the exile of Anaxagoras 
and Protagoras and the death of Socrates. For this reason, the thinkers 
decided to use a new name to designate their ac t i v i t y , one more "cautious" 
and "pract ical ," but more "base" and "inane." This new name was conceived 
for defensive reasons; as a precaution, the "thinker" had to protect himself 
against the wrath of his fellow-citizens who s t i l l clung to a religious 
position. This name would take into consideration not only the act iv i ty of 
unveiling real i ty but also what the common Athenian citizen would say about 
i t . 
This new name was philosophy, whose meaning concerned saying nothing 
precise; rather, i t was a word of "evasive" meaning, signifying the pursuit 
of a l l the new discipl ines, from natural philosophy to rhetoric. So, by 
440 B.C., this name that had appeared in 450 B.C., came to convey "an i n -
formal" manner of treating the ar ts , poetry, and ideas that were beginning 
to circulate among certain "elegant Athenians."15 
Aletheia as Methodical Revelation in Ortega 
There are some elements expounded in Ortega's writ ings, from 1910-1950, 
that should also be analyzed to help us better understand the concept of 
aletheia: a. the intel lectual process; b. revelation; and c. i l lumination, 
(a) The Intellectual Process. This is perhaps one of the f i r s t elements 
ascribed to the idea of aletheia. As early as 1910, in "Planeta Sitibumdo" 
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("Thirsty Planet"), Tt was said that truth has to be "invented," i.e., it 
could only be achieved through a systematic intellectual process. This 
idea of the search for truth, as dependent on a systematic intellectual 
process, was again presented in another article of 1910: "La Vision de la 
Historia - San Pedro y San Pablo" ("The Vision of History - Saint Peter and 
Saint Paul"). In this writing, Ortega insists on the necessity of relying 
on the intellectual analysis and "reconstruction" of experience as a means 
to search for truth. For the young Ortega of 1910, man cannot rely on his 
senses or on his memory when he is in search of truth. He has to submit 
his experiences to the rational analysis so as to reach a reliable interpre-
tation of their meaning. Ortega says: "It is not enough to see things; 
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it is necessary to analyze and reconstruct them" . . ."rationally." 
(b) Revelation. In this same article of 1910 about the vision of history, 
the idea of "revelation" was expressed as the culmination of an intellectual 
process. So, revelation implies the notion of reality being revealed after 
the "veil" or covering "crust" is taken off from it; it is not enough to 
"witness" or have a direct experience of something to really know it. 
One must analyze and "reconstruct" "rationally" the different elements 
of experience so as to make their facts "reveal" their truth to us. 
Illustrating this idea, Ortega, following his pedagogically oriented 
writing style, uses two appealing religious figures as metaphors to present 
his idea. San Pedro (St. Peter) was a "witness" of the living presence of 
Christ, but was too close to him and perhaps too emotionally involved to 
achieve a detached and rationally objective view of what Christ represented. 
This rationally objective view of Christ's historical meaning was achieved 
by San Pablo (St. Paul), whose conception of him was so rich in meaning that 
it made Theology possible. Ortega's point is that more is needed than direct 
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experience for a true understanding of rea l i ty . St. Peter, the direct 
"witness" of Christ, could be said had perhaps an aesthetic and affective 
understanding of his prophet, but he could not see a l l the historical and 
possible religious meaning of Christ's message. This meaning was achieved 
by St. Paul who, according to Ortega, had an objective "revelation" of the 
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t ruth of Christ: "St. Paul objecti f ies the meaning of Christ." 
(c) I l lumination. I t is in Meditaciones del Quijote (1914) that the concept 
of i l lumination is introduced for the f i r s t time. Illumination is that 
"momentaneous i l lumination," or understanding, or seeing of the truth 
discovered; i t represents the moment when the truth becomes evident. 
I l lumination completes the intellectual process, and the revelation, of 
aletheia; this together with the other two, wi l l furnish aletheia with 
i t s basic meaning in Ortega's philosophy. 
Let us refer to the analysis of A. Rodriguez lo see how he connects 
a, b, and c. Rodgriguez thinks that the most important element to stress 
in the aletheia is that of revelation, which, to him, implies two different 
qual i tat ive processes taking place as a result of the rational intel lectual 
process. These processes do not imply a temporal sequence in their 
occurence, but rather a logical correlation, one in which the objective 
rea l i t y appears to the in te l lec t , as i f to say naked or un-veiled. The f i r s t 
process is that in which the objective real i ty penetrates or makes contact 
with thought. The second is that of the understanding of the meaning of 
rea l i t y . Rodriguez calls this lat ter "the moment of evidence." His point 
seems to be that one element of the revelation should be referred to the 
object as i t stands "naked" before man, after i ts "vei ls" hiding i ts true 
rea l i t y have been taken off as a result of the intellectual process. The 
other process of revelation has to refer to that moment when the subject 
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accomplishes his understanding of the fact involved. Thus, we find that 
the first moment (or process) could be understood as one of "intuition" 
or immediate presence of the object, without the mediation of the concept. 
The second moment (or process) is that of "illumination" proper, i.e., of 
19 
understanding or evidence." One moment would not be complete without the 
other. The illumination is based on the intuition after which the mind 
can reach the understanding or evidential moment that makes us understand 
the "revelations."20 
Further Evolution of the Concept of Aletheia as: Interiority and 
bringing to the "open" or "surface," as what is "clear" and as 
talking to oneself or "logos," as "genuine" thought, and solitude 
This idea of considering philosophy as aletheia is so rich and 
important in Ortega's thought that it continues gaining in meaning up to 
his ^/ery last writings. One of the most Important elements for its 
connection to our educational theme is its element of interiority. (This 
idea of interiority, as we will see, is also basic to the idea of life 
discussed in our second chapter.) The way this idea of interiority can be 
connected to aletheia is as follows. 
Aletheia 1s not only a movement of discovery of the truth of the 
external reality but also of the internal reality of man, i.e., of his 
Inwardness. In this way, this concept becomes, in Ortega, a twofold process 
whereby man not only addresses the external reality but his internal 
reality as well. 
This idea 1s discussed in Que es Filosofia (1929). In this text, 
truth becomes an intellectual personal endeavor and commitment which should 
be thoughtfully analyzed. If man really cares for a truth he cannot accept 
any idea that may seem to explain it without careful analysis. And it is 
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in his "inwardness," in his "interiority" where he convinces himself of 
its worth and value. This may seem obvious, nonetheless, it carries some 
importance and completes the thought expressed at the beginning of this 
chapter where the distinction was made between tradition and reason. 
This latter was viewed as a shift from a collective interpretation of 
truth, to one based on the individual's own personal conviction. He will 
not take a truth for granted because it is held as such in society; he will 
prefer to achieve his own conviction of truth in his "interiority," where 
he stays alone with reason to analyze truth. But Ortega's purpose is not 
that the truth should be kept in man's "interiority," hidden from other 
people; (here enters the educational element of his philosophy). On the 
contrary, truth should be brought to the "open" and be made public. So, 
in the same way that the philosopher should bring to the "open" the reality 
hidden from truth, he should bring to the "open" also from his "interiority" 
the products of his research. This explanation makes clear why for Ortega 
the process of aletheia is twofold. 
The idea of bringing truth to the "open" is summed up in the Spanish 
concept of mamfestacion (to manifest), defined as "to talk," also of 
"logos." What is manifested or "talked" out is the truth unveiled so as to 
make it "patent," "clear," i.e., known. So, in bringing to the "open" or 
making "patent," the philosopher has brought to the "surface" what was 
deeply concealed. Ortega, as any well oriented philosopher and pedagogue 
would consider that—in this he makes explicit criticism of Martin Heidegger— 
instead of being obscure, philosophy should be an intent of making "clear," 
even "simple" what is deep and hidden. This idea of philosophy, as it may 
be already obvious to the reader, does not deny the idea of going beyond 
appearances, to discover what is hidden and difficult. Nonetheless, it 
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stresses—and this is one of its educational commitments—the idea that 
philosophy should be an enterprise of illumination and clarification of 
knowledge. And this is what aletheia intends to do when "unveiling" the 
"robes" of falsehood so as to "discover" truth. This makes to conceive of 
philosophy as a two-way road whereby, after submerging himself behind 
appearances to search for what is "veiled," the philosopher should bring 
to the "surface," bringing to the "open" in a "clear" way, the truth found. 
This idea is further developed in Que es el Conocimiento (What is 
Knowledge) (1931). Truth is connected here again with "logos" and "inner 
talk." Man needs to talk within "himself" about the reality of things 
discovered outside himself. That is, in order to understand the reality 
sought after, the philosopher has to consider in his own mind its reality 
so as to know and convince himself of its truth. This instance of aletheia 
could be better understood if we think of a situation in which one could be 
presented for the first time with all the elements of a fact: it is known 
that we would not understand the fact until we had thought about it for 
ourselves, as if telling ("talking") about its elements to ourselves, until 
we become inwardly convinced of their meaning. Only after we are convinced 
of the truth we have found can we communicate it or teach it to others. 
This idea is developed still further in En Torno a Galileo (Man and 
Crisis) (1933), in which truth is expressed as the "coincidence of man with 
himself." In this text, this "coincidence" implies adhering to and 
conducting one's life according to those truths, after analyzinq and findinq 
them to be in accordance with one's own innermost beinq. Orteqa points out 
in this text that man should follow his own "genuine thought," i.e., he 
should follow that idea with which he is in "aqreement." Man needs, therefore, 
to be clear "about what one's sincere attitude is toward each and every thing"; 
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it is important that each man "think what he actually thinks." If this 
is not accomplished, then man ends up pretending to believe; this leads to 
living in pseudo-beliefs which will make one's life of "restlessness," "deep 
otherness," "desolation," and "emptiness." 
Man cannot be convinced of that in which he does not believe; he cannot 
feign his own beliefs "or drug himself" with those attitudes most topical 
and designed according to formula without "feeling" uneasy and unhappy. So, 
to summarize this idea, let us quote the following: 
If (man) thinks badly, that is, without a sense of 
personal and intimate veracity, he lives badly, in 
pure anguish, full of problems and uneasiness. If 
he thinks well, he is well adjusted within himself; 
and that is the definition of happiness.^ 
Some years later, in O n gen Y Epilogo de la Filosofia (Origin and Epilogue of 
Philosophy) (1946), our author repeats aqain that philosophy represents an 
"inward" labor; he also notes that it is "interiority" because it is thought. 
Finally, in El Hombre y la Gente (Man and People) (1950), one of 
Ortega's most important books, the idea of aletheia is directly related to 
that of solitude. He says that in "solitude" man is his own truth, while in 
society he tends to be his mere "conventionality" or "falsification." Let 
us explain this. 
The idea Ortega introduced here is that man usually lives among 
interpretations of reality which the social environment and human tradition 
have been accumulating and inventing. Some of these interpretations and 
ideas on reality should be called genuine. For instance, in the case of 
confronting a man, it could be said that his body appears as an unquestion-
able reality to me. However, to say that in that body there is an "I," a 
human life, is an interpretation on my part, one made by summing up his 
gestures, the fact that he talks, etc. And it happens, according to Ortega, 
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that the vast majority of the things by which we live are not only pre-
sumptive, but usually illusory. These are things which we have heard being 
named, defined, evaluated and justified in our social medium. Most of those 
things we have heard from others, and without analysis, we have internalized 
as either true or probable and as representative of a genuine aspect of 
reality. It is with these things that we occupy our lives, because we are 
always doing something with or about these things. But since they are only 
interpretations put forth in general by others, as far as they relate to my 
life, these interpretations could be no more than pseudo-things, and my life, 
as far as it is concerned with them, is no more than a pseudo-life, an 
inauthentic life. Since we really do not know about those pseudo-things 
any more than we have been told or what we have been led to believe, in our 
relation to them we are not living a genuine life. That is, our genuine 
life would be one in which we would be free from the interpretations accepted 
by the other people, among which we are included and we have been since 
birth. To be free, then, we have to seclude ourselves in the solitude of 
our own inner life and put to analysis all those interpretations in order to 
see their true meaning and what their place really should be in uur lives. 
This leads us to the idea that man is in need of a periodical and 
thorough analysis of his life; he needs to go over the accounts of his life, 
checking his preferences, his activities and his actions. This implies 
that, instead of his viewing his life from the perspective of members of 
society, he should look at it from the perspective of individual solitude. 
According to Ortega, this is necessary to achieve a genuine personal and 
self-directed life. According to this viewpoint, it is in solitude that 
man is truth; while in society, usually, for following the traditional and un-
analyzed opinions of the social medium, he becomes his mere "conventionality" 
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or "falsification." So, part of the duty in the pursuit of an authentic 
life includes the activity of frequent withdrawal to the solitary depths 
of oneself. 
It is the philosopher who Ortega feels is capable of accomplishing 
this withdrawal with the most success. In his withdrawal to his interiority, 
he demands that the mere seeming probabilities and even enchantments and 
illusions in which he lives must show him their credentials so that he may 
determine their "genuine reality." 
Now, we can say that, in Ortega, the idea of philosophy as aletheia, 
consists not only in the unveiling of the truth of things, but also of the 
truth of man's life; it consists in "baring things and oneself, in stripping 
them to stark nakedness—to "what they are and I am." Hence, philosophy as 
aletheia, is "genuine" knowing, it is truth, "the terrible and desolate, 
solitary truth of things" when they are laid open; and that is the literal 
meaning of the word truth in the Greek language- aletheia, that is "to 
bare."25 
Aletheia, Knowledge, and Education 
We have seen that philosophy as aletheia implies not only a discovery 
of the truth of reality through a rationally guided intellectual process, 
bul also a discovery and unveiling of man's true attitude toward reality and 
toward himself. Philosophy as aletheia becomes then not only an intellectual 
tool in the analysis of truth but an ethical one; it should guide man, not 
only to knowledge for the purpose of mastering and dominating one's circum-
stances, but also for the purpose of serving as an orientation to the 
authentic and good life. So, Ortega's philosophy would be concerned with 
the purpose and use of knowledge in man's life. This does not imply, for 
instance, that one should not seek knowledge or the dominion of the world 
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through technology. As a matter of fact, he believes that science and 
technology are the means at hand by which to master reality and accomplish 
a qualitative good life in the society of masses. His point is rather one 
regarding the uses of knowledge and the place this should have in one's 
life. He rejects the idea of having knowledge for its own sake. This would 
be like placing life at the service of the idea of science or of knowledge. 
It is true that man cannot be himself if he does not exercise his intellect 
so as to have responsible ideas, i.e., ideas reflecting as truly as possible 
the objective reality of the world. But this is done for pragmatic reasons 
so that man's life may be conducted as best as possible. Therefore, life 
cannot be conceived for the sake of intelligence, science, culture; quite 
the contrary, these have no other reality than that which can be ascribed 
to them as "tools for life." 
If knowledge, intelligence, and culture are worshiped as the principles 
giving meaning to life, we incur an error because intelligence is left in 
the air, rootless and at the "mercy" of two hostile forces, (a) the bigotry 
of culture; and (b) the insolence against culture. These are false, unreal 
fashions of existence. For our author, as we will discuss in our next 
chapter, culture and knowledge should be put at the service of life, not the 
other way around as was done in the 19th Century. So, according to Ortega, 
intelligence, knowledge, and science become "tools" of life so as to make of 
it a better way of living. 
The traditional intellectual thought that man was defined as a rational 
animal; therefore, he concluded, man "ought" to think almost automatically. 
But, according to Ortega, when man is conducting his life as just a mere 
receptacle of tradition, without thinking the ideas and beliefs found in his 
social circumstance, he really does not know the meaning and truth of what 
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he receives. So, instead of sayinq that man thinks automatically because 
he is defined as a rational being, Ortega turns the formula around and 
says that: 
in order to live, man has to think, whether this 
pleases him or not. If he thinks badly, that is, without 
a sense of personal and intimate veracity, he lives 26 
badly, in pure anguish, full of problems and uneasiness... 
This position poses ^n educational problem. Many times man does not 
know or, even worse, he does not want to know which, among the many ideas 
he finds within himself, is the one that could constitute his own veritable 
belief. 
In such an instance aletheia could be pedagogically helpful. Let us 
remember that this concept represents an active process of searching for 
truth, but not of a truth that, after having been discovered, becomes a 
useful "recipe," a "right answer," or in its worst case trite knowledge. 
What is fundamental in aletheia is the process of dis Dvery itself, whereby 
a student, for instance, could relive the truth found by his own effort, 
though utilizing the teacher's aid and the classroom situation as resources 
in his pursuit of knowledge. In this way, as Julian Marias says, the truth 
found through aletheia becomes a "novelty," an "illumination," and a 
discovery. ^ 
Regarding this point, Ortega once wrote that: 
He who wishes to show us a truth should not tell it to us: 
let him simply allude to it with a brief qesture which 
starts an ideal trajectory in the air, along which we 
glide until we arrive at the feet of the new truth. Z8 
There are two points in this quotation that should be discussed for their 
pedagogical implications. Point one is that a truth per se, cannot be 
taught but must be discovered. Our author means by this that truth is a 
personal project to which the learner should feel committed. That is, he 
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has to actively engage himself in the pursuit of knowledqe. If this is not 
the case, we know by experience that the student may memorize passively some 
facts which he will forget in no time, because he has not truly learned. 
The learner needs to be "alluded" to the truth by the teacher and the cur-
riculum but, to learn the truth, he has to "glide" until he arrives "at the 
feet of the new truth." So, knowledge becomes an active process, not an 
inventory of right answers. This takes us to point two, namely, that for 
the learner, truth seems to be always "new." 
The point stressed here is that the pure and sudden "illumination" 
characteristic of a truth, i.e., of its true understanding, is only present 
at the moment of its "discovery." The student, therefore, has to pursue 
this "revelation" so as to really achieve knowledge. When he accomplishes 
this, he adds something "new" to his experience, the new truth that he comes 
to know. This idea can be clarified if we add to the above quotation the 
following: "He who wishes to show us a truth should place us in a situation 
where we will discover it for ourselves." According to this, the student 
has to be willing to search and to know; if he does not, he would only be 
achieving "right answers" or "useful formulae" that could be used, for 
instance, in a classroom situation when an exam is answered according to 
what has been taught. The true educator does not want to accomplish only 
this kind of replicative or associative level of knowledge. He wants to 
arouse in the student a creative willingness to go after truth, and not only 
understand facts but critically evaluate and question them. Nonetheless, 
this motivation or readiness to search for truth is not automatic. On the 
contrary, it is something with which the student has to be provided, putting 
him in the right educational "situation" or educational setting. 
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The following implications can be drawn from this educational view 
(1) Learning as "discovery" implies a personal engagement of the student 
whereby he learns truth by himself. This personal engagement embraces not 
only the method for learning but also the object of knowledge. (2) A right 
educational setting or circumstance should be provided so that the student 
can "discover" the truth by himself; the provision of such "situation" is 
the responsibility of the educational agency. (3) The student becomes the 
center or fulcrum of the educational activity since he is the one "discovering" 
truth; the teacher, the curriculum, and the school become facilitators for 
the "discovery." 
We are aware that such a view on education presents some puzzles that 
need analysis. For instance: Can the student discover truth by himself, 
or must he do it through the facilitators? Isn't there a predetermination 
of knowledge whereby what is "discovered" becomes dependent on the educational 
setting in which the student is placed? and, Are we fair in askinq the 
student to learn by himself; in other words, can he really go around trying 
to discover truth, or should we make him learn and follow the organized 
knowledqe as presented in the curriculum and the intellectual disciplines? 
We do not want to extend ourselves to the analysis of these educational 
puzzles in this chapter because Ortega's educational philosophy is related 
to his idea of human life.; thus, we will first discuss the concent of human 
life before fully discussing the educational theme. 
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NOTES - CHAPTER I 
It seems that, to Ortega, this traditional attitude represents an 
ingenuous supposition of man in its approach to truth. For our author, 
this seems characteristic, particularly, of "primitive societies; in these, 
abandonment of one's own life style is in favor of one that is more social 
and collective than what is usual in the so-called civilized and advanced 
societies. But Ortega says that it is "illusory" to think that predominance 
of tradition may cease to act in any period whatsoever. Even in the case 
of a highly intelligent and civilized man, he could not help following a 
great sector of traditional and conventional beliefs which are taken for 
granted. If he were not to do so, "his lack of security with regard to the 
greater port of his surroundings would be intolerable." So, the area of 
any life that may be guided by reason alone, it could be said, is rather 
small. See: Some Lessons in Metaphysics( New York- W. W. Morton and Co., 
1969) p. 109. 
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, The Theme of Our Time (New York: Norton & 
Norton, 1961) pp. 99-131 
In Notes on Thinking (1923), Orteqa makes an interesting remark 
regarding the logical capacity of the "primitive mind" in comparison with 
that of the men of science. He said that "primitive" man thouqht less 
logically than Poincare or Hilbert, not because his intellect was pre-
logical or illogical, "but because he did not as deliberately and constantly 
aspire to be logical as did these two men who were born into an unbroken 
logical tradition of twenty-six centuries." Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 
Concord and Liberty (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1946) p. 74. 
^For this analysis, see, in The Theme of Our Time (1923), "The Sunset 
of Revolution," p. 104 
Some Lessons in Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 109. 
Refer to note four. 
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Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty, "Proloque to a History of 
Philosophy" (New York: Norton and Norton, 1946), p. 115. 
8Ibid. 
90rtega says that it was necessary to "teach" the Spanish public how 
to think. But, unfortunately, Spain lacked the capacity of a conceptual 
thought; it had an "intellectual deficit." This was the Intellectual 
circumstance of Spain and the philosopher accepted it. So, since he could 
not speak to the Spanish public in a very viqorous philosophical lanquaqe, 
Ortega decided to speak to them in the language they understood and through 
the medium they accepted. Regarding this point he says: "this intellectual 
attempt had to be made there where one could find the Spanish man in the 
friendly chat, in the newspaper, in the lecture. It was necessary to 
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attract him to the intellectual concept with a gracious qesture." This 
implies a pedagogical principle in itself, that of trying to reach the 
learner from his own point of view, takinq into consideration his concrete 
social and individual circumstance. See, Obras Completas, Vol. IV, p. 367. 
°Lopes-Morillas, J., "Universities and Their Mission," Brown Alumni 
Monthly, Feb., 1956, p. 14. 
11 
According to Ortega, these philosophers were probably born by 
520 B.C.; their intellectual work was simultaneous, occurring around 500: 
see The Origin of Philosophy (New York- W. W. Norton and Co., 1967), p. 79. 
120p. cit., p. 62. 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid., p. 63. 
15According to Ortega's analysis, the word "philosophy" was "exceedingly 
vague" because it was not created as a specific term; it was merely an ordinary 
word already in existence in the Greek language. It was Plato who tried to 
convert it into a term; he had been preoccupied about its exact meaning, 
even in his early writinqs. This preoccupation he inherited from Socrates 
who had felt the urgent need for findinq a term to "encompass his activity": 
Socrates was the first Athenian citizen to engage publicly "in the new ideas," 
questioning tradition and the idea of the gods. But still in Plato there was 
some wandering in the use of the term. This is verified by Aristotle's 
analysis. When Aristotle confronted Plato's use of the term, he felt it was 
not clear enough. Thus, Aristotle distinguished a "first" philosoohy, which 
for him constituted the "genuine" philosophy. It is this "genuine" philosophy 
which he conceived as searching for truth, not any kind of truth, but that 
attainable only through a given mode of thought or method. So, in Aristotle, 
what "pertains" to "truth" signifies philosophy in its "strictest" sense. 
160bras Completas, Vol. I, p. 147. 
17Ibid., p. 157 
180bras Completas, Vol. I, p. 158. 
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Arroyo, another commentator of Ortega, seems to share this analysis 
to some extent. He says that the moment of "illumination" represents a 
"psychological" element in which the subject attains certainty, i.e., when 
he feels that he knows. He says this in El Si sterna Maduro de Ortega. 
20 
Rodriguez, Antonio, Perspectiva y Verdad (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 
1966), pp. 232-234. 
210bras Completas, Vol. IX, p. 632; Ortega cr i t ic izes here Heidegger's 
philosophy for being obscure on purpose. 
220bras Completas, Vol. I l l , p. 81. 
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"Ibid., p. 111. 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. 
"For Ortega the Latin word Veritas, verun, with its cognates verdad 
Veritas, must have come from an Indo-European root ver_which means "to say," 
and from there we have ver-bum, word. According to~0rtega, that saying 
would not be an ordinary one, but a religious and solemn one, a religious 
declaration in which we call God to witness what we are saying. In other 
words, it represents an oath. But to have God as a witness means that we 
stay "alone with the reality of things, so that between them and ourselves 
there is nothing and no one that veils, covers, dissembles, or hides them, 
and this absence of anything between them and ourselves . . . is truth." 
(For this translation see Ortega y Gasset, Jose, Man and People (New York. 
W. W. Norton and Co., 1957) pp. 99-100. 
27Ibid., p. 113. 
28It is interesting to note how hard it has been for the group of 
environmentalists to make the government and big corporations more concerned 
about the way the environment is being exploited. This exploitation of our 
natural resources has more than once been paralleled by the exploitation of 
our human resources. In Ortega it is not difficult to establish an analogy 
between the one and the other; after all, if knowledge acquires the power 
to master, and if it dominates reality with efficiency, much effort will be 
needed so as not to conceive of man as another resource ^o be exploited. 
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CHAPTER II 
IDEA OF HUMAN LIFE AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this chapter, I w i l l discuss Ortega's idea of human l i f e and i t s 
educational implications. In the description of this concept I w i l l 
show some of i t s basic categories, especially as they relate to education; 
these educational implications include concepts of vocation, freedom, 
inner-direction and self-real izat ion. The chapter w i l l be divided as 
follows: Human l i f e and self-knowledge; Categories of human l i f e ; 
Life as togetherness of the I and the world or the circumstance; Vocation, 
freedom and education; Ortega's definit ion of vocation; Vocation and 
freedom; Freedom as "necessary"; Freedom and education, A cr i t ica l view 
of Ortega's concepts of vocation and freedom. 
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Human Life and Self Knowledge 
The idea of human l i f e is of v i ta l importance in Ortega's philosophy 
and educational thought. From i t sprinqs his idea of the existence of a 
"togetherness" between the world and the I whereby a primary, or basic, 
metaphysical real i ty is constituted. From i t springs also Orteqa's idea of 
vocation, freedom, sel f - real izat ion, and inner-direction, as well as the 
concept of knowledge as a " tool" for l i f e . In the exposition of his idea 
of human l i f e , Ortega addresses modern man as to the necessity of knowing 
himself and the surrounding world or circumstances as thoroughly as possible. 
This necessity of knowing himself and the world is expressed in the concept 
of l iv ing at the "height of the times," in the sense of being aware of the 
social and cultural conditions, and the ideas and beliefs present in one's 
society. 
To know which ideas and beliefs one truly prefers is important in 
Ortega's thought. He thinks that one of the problems of modern man is that 
he does not really know which are his ideas, the ones that he really believes 
in , and which are not. He has received so many thoughts that he does not 
2 
know which of them are those he actually thinks, those he believes in . 
According to our author, th is pushes man to l ive in pseudo beliefs and 
commonplaces which fa ls i fy his l i f e . This is one of the characteristics of 
modern man's sense of "al ienation"; man f i l l s himself with empty l i f e , 
notwithstanding a l l the efforts put to " f i l l " himself with one conviction or 
another, without ever real ly managinq to feel a sense of accomplishment. 
To achieve this sense of accomplishment the individual wi l l need to find out 
which are his "own" veritable ideas and bel iefs, from among the jungle of 
information and knowledge to which he is constantly submitted. To accomplish 
th is , he should seek, as we saw in chapter one, to "know himself." So, 
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according to this thought, instead of man's searching for a sense of 
meaning and accomplishment following the dictates of his group, society, 
the State, etc. , he should take ef for t and time to examine the influence 
that these institutions and similar agencies have on his l i f e . This would 
be an important step toward the realization of an authentic l i f e . In 
working out this idea of realization of this kind of l i f e , Ortega presents 
his generation with a new idea of l i f e , of human l i f e , and with some 
alternatives which fac i l i t a te the realization of that engagement. 
Categories of Human Life 
Ortega's idea of human l i f e faci l i tates man's awareness of himself and 
of his individuality; for him l i f e , human l i f e , is conceived as the "radical" 
rea l i ty ; (here radical is used in the sense of "root") . In this thought, 
i t is in man's l i f e where "we must f ina l ly find and assure a l l our knowledge 
of anything,"5 So, i t is in l i f e where a l l other real i t ies must necessarily 
appear, since i t is the "basic rea l i ty . " 
Interpreting this thought, H. C. Raley in his book, Ortega Philosopher 
of European Unity (1971), says that the universe may be f i l l e d with in f in i te 
forms of real i ty but "those that are knowable to man must come to him 
through the prism of l i f e . " 6 According to this interpretation, man's l i f e 
becomes the real i ty in which a l l other real i t ies assume meaning and 
structure. Within such an intellectual scheme, education wi l l play a 
particular role, which we intend to show as our analysis progresses. But 
f i r s t , le t us describe some categories which are related to l i f e and which 
could be related to Ortega's idea of education. 
Ortega, following a tradi t ion that goes back to Plato, conceives of 
man as being basically a social being in the sense that most of what he 
thinks, believes, and does, is inspired in his cultural t radi t ion. At the 
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same time Ortega says that man does not have an "essence" but a historical 
past which, basically, structures his present. Almost all of his behavior 
is guided by what is "social," and "traditional" and thus "collective." 
Let us suppose that a man resolves to follow only reason and his own criteria 
in his life, leaving aside the solutions offered to life by his socioculture. 
He would then have to re-think almost everything, but such a task, not even 
the "greatest genius" in history could accomplish. So, he who may use reason 
and his individual criteria alone to conduct the affairs of his life, 
"cannot, in fact, follow this norm except in small sectors of his life, the 
rest of it he entrusts to tradition and lives on it"; society with its 
traditional past "carries him in its arms and, at the same time, keeps him 
prisoner." But Ortega thinks that this should not be a reason for man to 
forget the individual element of his life. He wants to teach his students 
and readers that notwithstanding the strong influence of what is social, 
there is an important element of what is personal, spontaneous, creative and 
original, in man's life that should be developed as much as possible. This 
has important educational implications for us, in the sense of, for instance, 
the kind of man that our schools should aim to create. Ortega, for instance, 
stresses the subjective and personal element of life, but without fallinq 
into any solipsism or dimmishment of the idea of an external world and 
Q 
real i ty . For him, as we w i l l see later , the I and the world form a 
"togetherness" excluding thus, accordinq to Ortega, any idea of a metaphysical 
solipsism. Notwithstanding Ortega's rejection of any metaphysical 
"solipsism," he says that l i f e is only the l i f e of each person- ''my l i f e " 
is evidential to me and i t s presence is immediate. Each one of us l ives his 
l i f e from "within," and what each individual person lives for himself is 
directed toward himself. Thus, the real i ty of one's individual and personal 
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life consists of what it is for him who -s "within it," while and as long 
as he lives. Accordingly, human life is "personal," "interiority," 
"withinness," and even "radical solitude," because I am, for instance, the 
one to feel my toothaches and my anguishes, and my happiness, to the extent 
that they happen to me in my life. This dimension of life of being 
"personal," "interiority," and "withinness," is important in education, 
particularly if we relate the idea of "withinness" to that of child-centered 
education. Within this context, the concept of working from the child's 
"withinness" could be understood in the sense of taking into consideration 
the child's capacities, his previous cultural experience, his weak and 
strong points. Within this context a re-evaluation of our idea of the 
child is also accomplished in the sense that it is understood that his 
perception of the world and his use of language, is different from that of 
the adult. Relating to these points, Ortega said once that we have to take 
into consideration that the child has a world of his own, and that the 
perception he has of reality is different from that of the adult; "if we 
compare the medium m which the adult lives with that of the child, we can 
notice a difference right away." And he adds right away that one important 
difference that we have to take into consideration in the child's education 
is that he is not attracted, as is the adult, by "the real objects" of his 
circumstance; for him the most important objects are those of his "liking" 
or "desire." The adult, on the contrary, usually "is inclined to follow 
11 
what is real, even though it may not be desirable." In this analysis, 
Ortega's thought resembles Piaget's, when this implies in his writinqs 
"that the child's world is in many respects qualitatively different from 
that of the adult."12 
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For Ortega, what happens many times with traditional education is that 
this follows ar> archaic idea whereby the student is viewed as a malleable 
potential adult. Being merely "potential," he should be made to reach 
"perfection" similar to that present in adult life. So we initiate him in 
1 3 our more mature ways as a step in the right direction. Nonetheless, we 
know that just giving importance to the student's withinness, as Ortega 
suggests, though important, does not produce necessarity good education. 
Education, besides giving importance to the subjective element of the 
student's "withirness," should also give importance to an objective element, 
i.e., of that which the student ought to know and which, for instance, is 
taught in the curriculum. Ortega, as in other instances, is vague reqardinq 
this point. He seems to want an individualized and child-centered education, 
but he is not clear as to the curriculum to follow, etc. So the student of 
his thought will have to help in giving some structure to his ideas. A way 
of doing this could be by making some inferences from another of his 
concepts or life categories, namely, the life conceived as "open." This 
conception of life as "open" seems again to be an Ortegean effort to step 
away from the perils of solipsism. If life is "interiority" and "withinness, 
how is it to be explained in its relationship with and knowledge of the 
world or circumstance? This is explained in the sense that life becomes 
the "open area" in which any other reality may manifest itself. Therefore, 
a reality, to achieve meaning for me must in "some way" present itself in 
my life either directly to me ab a personal experience or, vicariously, as 
part of the traditional package among the things that usually one takes for 
granted. Regarding this point, Harold C. Raley says that "Life is not the 
only reality, but all other realities are rooted in it, interpreted through 
14 
its needs and bias, and attain through it their ultimate validity." 
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The idea of man's l i f e being "open" and being-in-the-world or circum-
stance is educationally important. What is pedagogically important here 
is the way Ortega relates the notion of knowledge of the world, knowledge 
about the world or even some technical knowledge, to his idea of l i f e . For 
him, no knowledge of anything is "suff ic ient ly profound or radical i f i t 
does not begin by searchinq the sphere that is our l i f e to discover and 
define where and how that thing makes i t s appearance in i t , looms, springs 
up, arises, or, in short, exists in i t . " 1 5 I t could then be said that the 
meaning that a rea l i t y , or an experience may have for us, w i l l depend on how 
i t relates to our l i f e ; in other words, we need to know "where" and "how" 
that "thing" makes i t s appearance in our l i f e . Perhaps a good example to 
i l lus t ra te this is the d i f f i cu l t i es that our educational system has had m 
educating blacks, Latinos, and members of other minority groups. I t is true 
that Ortega does not mention the d i f f i cu l t ies of the teaching of minority 
groups. However, i t is clear to me that an analogy can be established to 
relate Ortega's thought to this problem. Perhaps the best way to i l lus t ra te 
this is with the I.Q. Tests. Blacks and Latinos have tradit ional ly flunked 
these, and i t was thought they were stupid. Not unt i l recently was i t thought 
that, for being middle-class value oriented, these tests were not rel iable 
to really measure the I.Q. of the children of these two groups. I f we 
apply Ortega's scheme to this s i tuat ion, we can see that the "place" and 
meaning that certain knowledge, s k i l l s , and values have in the middle-class 
children, is not the same as i t is for the blacks or Latinos. The Latino 
ch i ld , for instance, being more family oriented, w i l l not be as sel f - re l iant 
and with a strong sense of achievement as the Anglo chi ld; neither would 
he try to be as competitive in attempting to please his teachers. He would 
prefer his teacher to be nice and kind to him as a recognition of his being 
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himself rather than as a reward for his good behavior. Only after he is 
being treated nicely does he feel obliged to comply with the teacher's 
requirements. It is clear that, for instance, the Puerto Rican, or the 
Mexican-American "place" their learning and schoolinq process in a different 
"place" in their lives; in a "place" perhaps more related to the affective 
domain. In such a case, though not exactly the same, Professor Harry S. 
Broudy has suggested in his lectures that a "philetic" approach as a 
learning strategy would be more adequate to facilitate the teachmq-
1R 
learning situation. 
Life as Togetherness of the I and the World or the Circumstance 
In addition to l i f e ' s being "withinness" and "open," i t is other 
things; i t represents, above a l l , a "togetherness" of the world (or 
circumstance) and the I. Let us analyze this concept, 
a. " I am I and my circumstance" - - In the book Meditaciones del Quijote, 
(Meditations on Quixote) (1914), our author expressed his formula that 
perhaps best characterizes his idea of human l i f e as "togetherness" with 
the world or circumstance. To express this concept our author forwarded 
the formula, " I am I and my circumstance, and to save myself I have to save 
her." This formula, which wi l l be explained la te r , expresses a dynamic 
interrelationship between man and the world. Nonetheless, instead of 
l imi t ing the relationship of the I to the world, Ortega preferred usinq 
circumstance. For him, this concept expresses the notion of what is around 
(circum) the I . The circumstance, while representing that which is 
surrounding the I , becomes at the same time that to which the I is i n t r i s i -
cal ly related. This relationship is not only physical or geographical; i t 
implies also the socio-cultural and historical elements in which man finds 
himself immersed. The circumstance represents then l i f e ' s possibi l i t ies and 
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limitations, and it even includes one's own body, as far as it is a "thing" 
with which one must deal. 
So the relationship between the I and the circumstance is fundamental, 
essential to the very concept of human life. Ortega makes reference to the 
importance of this relationship when saying that the I and the circumstance 
need each other to be "saved." Julian Marias, perhaps Ortega's most well-
known disciple, seems to go along with this interpretation. In his book, 
Ortega, Man and Vocation (1971), he interprets the relationship between I 
or man and his circumstance as "needy." For him, each ingredient of the 
formula is insufficient without the other, while together they combine the 
elements of man's life. Let us remember that circumstance is intelligible 
in the sense of that which is around (nrcum) the I_; therefore, it is to be 
understood as that which is referred to by the I. Moreover, the I is 
"circumstantial," i.e., it is intrinsically related to that circumstance, 
constituted by that "reference." 
This idea is again presented and systematically discussed in two 
important works of our author: Que es Filosofia (What is Philosophy) (1929), 
and El Hombre y la Gente (Man and People) (1949-50). In Que es Filosofia, 
he makes an extensive analysis of the two elements present in human life, 
the I and the circumstance. In this book Ortega points out again that 
neither the I, nor the circumstance, could be conceived as realities 
independent of each other. Life cannot be abstracted, segregated from the 
world or the circumstance because at the very core of his reality, both 
man's life and circumstance become inextricably merged into one reality. 
Ortega thinks it is an abstraction to conceive of an I if it were not 
immersed in a circumstance of world. The same is true with the idea of 
a world in itself, independent of a subject of I by which to know it. 
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Regarding this point, Ortega says, "I am aware of what I am thinking when, 
for example, I take account of what I see or think."20 So, in this 
philosophy, there is the intention of stressing equal ontological value to 
the I and the circumstance in the constitution of the human life.21 Adding 
more to this idea it is said: "if the subject exists, so does the object 
which is seen by me. The star needs me, but also I need the star . . . If 
the subject exists, so does the object, inseparably and vice versa.nc~ If 
I who think exist, so does the world in which I think. According to this 
thought, it should be kept in mind that the "fundamental, the radical truth 
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is the coexistence of myself with the world"; existing, thus, is first and 
foremost "coexisting." It represents an I, myself, perceiving something which 
is not myself; it is I loving another being; it is I suffering from things. 
In the same way that things depend on the I, also the I "depends" on them, 
on the world. There exists an "interdependence" betwen the I and the world, 
a "correlation," a "coexistence." By virtue of this interrelationship, the 
world is what it continues to be because of me, but at the same time becoming 
something dynamic, confronting me, opposinq me; and I am the one who acts up-
on it, lookinq at it,dreaming of it, suffering from it, loving and detesting 
it. From here on "human life" is affirmed as primary reality: 
a reality consisting of a self which sees the world, 
thinks about it, touches it, loves it or detests it, is 
enthusiastic about it or irritated at it, transforms it, 
exhausts it, suffers it—that is what has always been 
called "living." .This is my life, our life, the life of 
every one of us." 2 4 
In El Hombre y la Gente (Man and People) (1949-50), Ortega presents 
again his analysis of human life. It is clear here how this term has evolved 
to represent more than a coexistence between the I and the circumstance. 
In this book, the individual and personal dimension of the concept is 
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stressed, thus we find its dimension of solitude, i.e., of radical solitude. 
In this text, life as "radical reality" is conceived of as the "scenario" 
where the other realities appear. But this "scenario" occurs in the "life 
of each person"; even what one calls other people's life is something that 
appears in the "scenario" that is "my" life. Even though I can "see" some 
other person and have the perception of his gestures, speech, etc., I am not 
"inside" his life; I do not "live" it. His toothache, for instance, since 
it does not happen to me, is a "supposition," a "hypothesis" that I make, 
an inference, while my pain is "unquestionable." From his "pain" what I 
have as patent is the "spectable" of it, "its signs." From that and my 
previous experience in which I have seen people in pain, I build up a 
"hypothesis" whereby I explain to myself his pain. The idea underlining 
this interpretation is again that of conceiving human life as including: 
"two terms with identical value and reality: the somebody, the x, 
the man who lives, and the world, environment or circumstance in 
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which, like it or not, he has to live." 
So, in this text, the relationship between man and his circumstance 
is also stressed; and it is pointed out again that to talk of any reality 
it should be related to the meaninq it gets into my life. Nonetheless, 
the ideas of life as individual and personal point to the dimension of life 
as being also solitude. This concept has serious implications in Ortega's 
idea of education. The most obvious of them can be regarded as the concept 
of vocation and freedom. Let us examine them. 
Vocation, Freedom and Education 
Vocation and freedom are two concepts that directly relate to both the 
idea of life and to that of education in Ortega. That is why we preferred 
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to leave their discussion toward the end of this chapter so as to connect 
the educational implications of the idea of life to these two concepts. 
For Ortega, the aims of education, even though taking into consideration 
the practical and utilitarian aspects of societal life, should not be guided 
by them as its most important consideration. To do that would represent a 
betrayal of the concept of life as the reality in which other realities 
take their meaning. The practical dimension of choosing a vocation is 
important, but a vocation should not be chosen mainly for this reason. It 
is not that aspects regarding the practical elements of a vocation should 
be ignored. Ortega does not seem to forget that, for he grants them an 
important place in, for instance, his idea of the mission of the university. 
But, in his case, the vocational decision should be made more in terms of 
the realization of a personal "project of life," rather than in just the 
utilitarian benefits of a professional career. So, vocation is related in 
this thought with the notion of self-realization. This conception makes 
Ortega follow an educational humanistic tradition which had already been 
expressed to some extent in Friedrich Froebel when he said that education 
?7 
"aims at the realization of a life which is true to its true calling.'"1' 
Ortega's Definition of Vocation 
We find present in Ortega, as in Froebel, the notion of vocation 
defined as a true "calling," together with the idea that education should 
be authentic to that "calling." Our author says that vocation is man's 
authentic "project of being." For him, "each man finds among the different 
possibilities of being, offered to him by his social and cultural circum-
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stance, one of those that he prefers and for which he feels a calling." 
We think that in some cases this could be the case, but, we oppose making a 
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generalization establishing as a fact the possibi l i ty of man's vocation as 
f i t t i n g in the different choices offered to him by his social medium. We 
think that the fu l f i l lment of such a f i t t i ng is particularly d i f f i cu l t in 
the industrial and p lura l is t ic society; but th is w i l l be discussed more 
abundantly at the end of this chapter. 
In other texts, vocation is referred to as "a strange voice" that comes 
from our secret and most intimate depth, from our innermost beinq, that 
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"cal ls" on us to choose a certain kind of l i f e or vocation from among many. 
At other times, i t is called man's "destiny" or "preferred sel f . " 
According to this thought, we should dare cultivate that "preferred" 
"project of being" which, as can be analyzed, represents the kind of l i f e 
with which one may feel most intimately ident i f ied. 
This leads Ortega to think that man, to lead an authentic l i f e , should 
i n 
orient i t according to his "own self" or vocation; therefore, i t is led 
according to what is most spontaneous and personal in him. This is an 
obvious inference since man would be trying to f u l f i l l that which he feels 
represents his true "preferred sel f . " 
This leads us to an interesting implication for education of this 
idea of vocation, whereby an inner and self-directed l i f e , oriented toward 
a sel f - real izat ion, is implied. Ortega follows in this a rule of thumb of 
Western education that, at least in theory, intends to develop in the 
student, a capacity to think for himself and to be self-directed. In the 
case of our author, this inner-direction and self-real izat ion implies 
following one's "project of being," or "vocation" because this turns out to 
31 be his "genuine thing to do." But "things to do" and things to choose, 
lead us to the discussion of another important educational concept and 
important element of human l i f e : freedom. 
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Vocation and Freedom 
Ortega's idea of freedom derived basically from the fact of man's 
trying to f u l f i l l his " l i f e project" or "preferred self" in a social and 
natural circumstance. Man is always doing something in his circumstance 
for which he has to choose from among options. I t is this deciding for 
himself one option while rejecting another that constitutes one of the basic 
characteristics of man's freedom. Man has usually in his l i f e different 
alternatives to choose and follow when confronting his different problems. 
This p lura l i ty of alternatives is due, according to Ortega, to the "mult i-
sided" quality of the circumstance. The socio-culture, as well as Nature, 
offers man many options from among which he can choose. 
Freedom as "Necessary" 
This idea of freedom as choosing among options is neither oriqinal 
nor new to Ortega; on the contrary, i t has been treated by different 
3? 
philosophers. One instance of this is Ralph Barton Perry's def in i t ion. 
Nonetheless, Ortega's original interpretation of freedom is seen when 
he defines i t as "necessary freedom." This is explained in the sense that 
man has "options" among which to choose, but he cannot escape from having 
to choose, to prefer. 
This seems paradoxical because, on one hand, man's decisions appear to 
be free while on the other these appear as "imposed." But what is imposed 
is the necessity to choose, not what is chosen. And i t is that man, to be, 
has "always to be doing something", to l ive implies a perennial making of 
decisions. And each decision is important because i t represents the material 
from which we realize our "preferred sel f ," or vocation, i . e . , the kind of 
l i f e that we wi l l l i ve . In other words, we are constantly deciding our 
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biography. Perhaps that is what Ortega means when he says that in each act 
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consciously performed, "we are deciding the whole of our l i f e . " 
From this concept of freedom stems several others l i ke : Pre-occupation 
and v i ta l responsibil i ty. 
The individual having to choose amonq dif ferent options, has to t ry to 
make his choices the best way he can. That is why l i f e is and should be 
preoccupation; this is meant l i t e r a l l y , i . e . , to be preoccupied. Every 
moment of the day man has to decide what he is going to do the next moment 
of his l i f e . Of course, one can occupy oneself in many different things. 
However, this kind of preoccupation should be oriented, pointed, to a kind 
of l i f e preferred. So one should be preoccupied to l ive one's l i f e project. 
This means that one should plan ahead the realization of his v i ta l project; 
thus this planning and analysis of one's options in l i f e are one's v i ta l 
responsibi l i ty. This entails a thorough knowledge of the circumstances 
where one is to realize one's "project of being." Knowledge is a fundamental 
element necessary for what can be labeled as an "enlightened freedom." 
Man has to know as thoroughly as possible his circumstances, where to 
realize his vocation, so as to be capable of making an "enlightened" choice. 
This is not an easy task because i t seems that not everybody is 
prompted to put on his shoulders the burden of having to be accountable for 
his freedom and inner " ca l l " or vocation. Man usually seems to better 
accept the models of his group rather than to follow his own cr i ter ia and 
w i l l . Nonetheless, Ortega believes that for the man wi l l ing to master his 
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"free project" of being, l i f e becomes fu l l of "meaning." 
Freedom and Education 
Would we l ike our students to be free? Yes, because without freedom 
of choice no qualitative moral act is possible. We want them to learn that 
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before deciding on an option they should weight i t and examine i ts 
consequences for themselves as well as for others, and, above a l l , they 
should learn that i f they want to f i l l their lives with that "meaning" of 
being true to one's "preferred sel f ," they should take f u l l responsibil ity 
for thei r choices. But, as Professor Harry S. Broudy says, not everybody 
35 wants "the freedom that carries the price tag of responsibi l i ty." I t 
seems easier for many people to have one's l i f e shaped by others or by the 
circumstances. 
This is not d i f f i c u l t to understand. This is the way we have been 
tradi t ional ly raised- as small children we are not given the chance to 
ascertain our own options, at home and at school Later, as adults, usually 
the same is the case in the job and with the different inst i tut ions with 
which we relate. Perhaps, i f we want to see our students wi l l ing to exert 
their freedom, we should teach them to beware of this situation where their 
actions and attitudes are "prescribed" as Freire says, by the ones above 
them.36 
For Ortega i t is through self-determination that man accomplishes self-
real ization. Only by becoming inner-directed can man t ru ly feel that he is 
realizinq himself, i . e . , f u l f i l l i n g his vocation of a "preferred se l f . " I t 
is true that there is a strong social determination of the kind of vocations 
to follow. Few men, i f any, could alone, by themselves, invent a new 
profession or career with which to realize their vocation. But then, alonq 
Ortega's thought, what is important is to follow what one feels is one's 
choice, as the option to follow. In the case of the student, i t is his 
responsibil ity to have an "enlightened" choice, and to accomplish i t , he 
should know as thoroughly as possible about the alternatives at hand. At 
the same time, i t is the teacher's and school's responsibil ity to present 
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him with the different alternatives or options which he may choose to follow. 
Ortega says that perhaps the most general aspect of which one can talk 
regarding vocation is that of happiness. All men, as so many times have 
been said, search for happiness. But an important part of this happiness is 
the satisfaction of fulfilling, what we feel as our "mission" in life, i.e., 
our vocation. 
A Critical View of Ortega's Concepts of Vocation and Freedom 
Before closing this chapter, we want to raise some objections to 
Ortega's Idea of vocation and of freedom. 
As relating to vocation, we agree with Ortega that it is important that 
the student know or discover as best as he can which professional career 
will best fit his interests and potentialities. Nonetheless, we disagree with 
what we consider a simplistic treatment in his analysis of some of the 
elements of this concept. As educators, we know that one of the most 
difficult and sometimes agonistic situations in which the student finds 
himself is that of having to choose his career. It is more rare than frequent 
to find a student, particularly 1n his first years of college, sure of what 
he wants to study or be in the future. Ortega does not discuss much of 
this problem; what he does is mainly emphasize the moral convenience of 
choosing right. But, we find that many times, at best, one can make only a 
rough approximation when choosing one's vocation. What is more common, could 
be said, is that our social Institutions try to make the individual convince 
himself that his Interests are fulfilled by what they offer. In this way 
he has to accommodate his spontaneity and creativity, his interests, to 
those of the institution, being this the school, the church, or the State. 
If the individual is, I would say, converted to an Institutionalized way of 
conceiving reality, then he would be accepted as a member and share the 
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"benefits" of belonging. Regardinq this point, i t is worth repeating what 
Fr i tz Pappenshim says in his book, The Alienation of Modern Man: 
"one of the basic goals of our period seems to be 
development of the adjusted man, who gets along with 
people and whose thinking does not d i f fer from the 
generally accepted values and norms. Our schools are 
trying eagerly to imbue the students with this ideal. , 7 
I t also becomes the standard for the desirable instructor." 
So the tendency is to create an "adjusted" and "standard" man. 
Perhaps one of the reasons accounting for this tendency is that in a 
p lura l is t ic and changing society l ike ours, the personal and social roles of 
people are not that easy to be seen, i . e . , they do not present themselves to 
the individual in a clear-cut manner.3" This may make any person feel at a 
loss when making his choices since he w i l l not real ly know how they would 
f i t his preferences. Ortega seemed to be aware of th is to a certain point, 
but we think that the solution he offers is poor. He said that to achieve 
his project of being, man must test i t in the circumstance, i . e . , the prof i le 
of what man prefers "emerges in the confrontation of our vocation and the 
39 circumstance." I f we take, for instance, a student not sure of what 
career to fol low, he may be able to read and investigate courses in the 
dif ferent curricular areas. He wi l l then see what his reaction is to the 
dif ferent curr icula, etc. In Ortega, th is could serve as a way of testing 
one's vocation in the circumstance. According to him, this w i l l make the 
circumstance "respond" to the pressure of my project of being in a dynamic 
interrelat ionship. This "response" of the circumstance wi l l serve as a 
test for my vocation. 
I think that even though interesting, this Ortegean analysis does not 
offer a real solution to the puzzle of how to get to know our true vocation 
and role in l i f e . Not many people w i l l have the opportunity of "testing" 
and re-testing instances of their preferences, so as to f ina l l y determine 
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their vocation: the social system as it is structured plus their obvious 
lack of material resources to go on indefinitely makinq their "testing," 
would hamper their chances of really getting to know their vocation. We 
know that only a small number of the population has the capability, the 
time, and resources, to really fulfill their aspirations of self-realization. 
Only a very small segment of the population will have as much education and 
knowledge to achieve that "enlightened" choice we have been referring to. 
Nonetheless, we think that Ortega's analysis on vocation, freedom, 
and its implications for a self-determination and self-realization has some 
importance if referred to the aims of a moral education. In makinq this 
statement, we follow McKlintock's interpretation of Ortega in his book, 
Man and His Circumstances: Ortega as Educator. McKlintock interprets 
Ortega to mean that man should look upon himself so that his practical 
behavior may correspond to his inner being, to what he conceives as his most 
authentic self. This is of particular interest because of the importance 
given to the idea of self-realization. According to this analysis, self-
realization is only possible if man becomes aware of himself, of his inner-
most being, so as to realize his project of being in his circumstance, 
in his personal and social life. He even qoes as far as to state that Ortega's 
thought helped him in his own personal and ethical commitments. He says 
regarding this: 
After all I had learned from others to think that America 
was special, exempt from the foibles of European nations ... 
Being American for me has ceased to be sufficient, no more 
sufficient in itself than my being from New York and you 
perhaps from Milan or somewhere else ... And much of what I 
have to say about Ortega is intended—in keeping with his own 
example—as a small but serious contribution to the creative 
effort of devising a future for the West.40 
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McClintock suggests that we should follow Ortega's thoughts in the sense 
that we should repudiate the "dead gods and dying rituals of the epoch" as 
a means of reasserting our one's own being. To achieve this, man cannot 
cease being an individual, a person capable of maintaining his consciousness 
and "critical self-awareness," seeking to find the "essential individual" in 
the midst of a depersonalized group. One of the fundamental aspects of 
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education should be to "assert a meaningful selfhood." 
Besides Ortega and McClintock, we can find other instances in contempo-
rary philosophy of education where this thought is considered as important; 
C. E. Silverman and Ivan Illich are other instances of it. If we take 
Silverman, he says in his book, Crisis in the Classroom: 
Freedom to explore, to taste one's ideas as a means of 
finding out who one is and what one believes—these are 
luxuries a well-run school cannot afford. As a student 
summed it up, 'It's all a question of what they want to 
produce, not what we want to become.'43 
To the student, Silverman states knowledge, teaching, and the school, in 
general, become unrelated to the student's inner life, to the kind of life 
he wants to lead. At worst, this relinquishment of the student's 
spontaneity, produces the kind of alienation and rejection of authority and 
of "the whole notion of culture, of discipline and of learninq, with which 
we are now contending." 
If this could be said to be the case, then we are confronting a 
difficult task: we have to find new strategies to educate our youth. What 
should the school and society do to accomplish this endeavor? We will try 
to analyze this puzzle in the fourth chapter. Now let us state that the 
school should be made to realize those "luxuries" conceived as unthinkable 
today. The school should help in the realization of the idea of self-
realization and in the fulfillment of one's individual and personal life in 
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one's circumstance. We should avoid what Ivan I l l i c h says in his 
Deschooling Society (1970): 
Students often redouble their resistance to teaching 
as they f ind themselves more comprehensively manipulated... 
(this due to) . . . the fundamental approach common to a l l 
schools—the idea that one person's judgment should 
determine what and when another person should learn. 5 
These two chapters constitute the f i r s t part of the thesis. Here I 
have dealt basically with the more philosophical elements of Orteqa's thought 
and some educational implications. In the second part of the thesis, which 
constitutes Chapters I I I and IV, I w i l l analyze Ortega's pedagogical ideas 
proper. For this analysis—as wi l l be seen—I w i l l draw from the findings 
and ideas of Chapters I and I I . 
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CHAPTER I I I 
THE CONCEPTS OF EUROPEANIZATION OF SPAIN AND OF IDEAS AND BELIEFS 
In this chapter, as stated in the preface, I w i l l be dealing with some 
of Ortega's basic ideas and beliefs about the aims of education within his 
concrete circumstance, Spain. Ortega believed that Spain's basic problem 
was "educational." He finds himself as a member of a nation which once was 
r i ch , powerful, and fu l l of glory; but has become weak and has lost contact 
with the real i t ies of the modern world. To solve this problem and "save" 
Spain, Ortega considers as the solution, the education of his generation 
to put i t at the "height of the times." But from where do the ideas and 
the beliefs to be followed in that educational process come? Ortega's 
answer is that the ideas to be followed should be Furopean. He thinks that 
Europe—m particular, England, Germany, and France, each having contributed 
so much to philosophical and scient i f ic thought, which Spain lacks—should 
be a good paradigm to follow. So he asks for "Spain's Europeanization" 
(europeizacion de Espana). Nonetheless, Ortega did not want to relinquish 
the national beliefs rooted in the Spanish tradit ion and characteristic of 
a Spanish personality. He asks for a "Europeanization," within a Spanish 
national framework, of Europe's ideas. Orteqa wanted to make of Spam a 
more intel lectual ly centered country; his point was that Spain lacked the 
"c lar i ty of ideas" of Europe, i .e . , i t s spir i tual integration to the 
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European community. This idea that started to appear in Ortega's educational 
thought as early as 1906, in his article, "Pidiendo una Biblioteca" 
("Demanding a Library"), fully bloomed in 1930 in his book Meditacion de 
Europa (Meditation of Europe). In this text he expresses the concept of 
"unity in variety," whereby Spain, as an individual nation, would be able, 
after joining the spiritual concept which is Europe, to contribute in a 
positive way, to its advancement. 
The chapter will be divided as follows: Ideas and beliefs held in 
Ortega's contemporary Spain; Ortega, objectivism and Spain, Education of 
the masses and the socialization of the school as a pedagogical resource 
and an educational aim; Socialization of the school; From adhesion to the 
European thought to its criticism; Historical reason, ideas and beliefs, 
Historical reason, life, and reason, Life as action and as reason; 
Intellectualism, Byzantinism and education, Ideas, beliefs, historical 
reason and education; Intellectual schema, ideas and beliefs, Ideas and 
beliefs, social change, and education; Some critical remarks regarding 
Ortega's conception of ideas and beliefs. 
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Ideas and Beliefs Held in Ortega's Contemporary Spain 
Perhaps the big issue of the Spain of Ortega's youth was the search for 
a new idea of Spain, conforming with the real i ty of the turn of the century. 
The old bel ie fs , part icularly those regarding Spain as an international power, 
had come ashes after the mil i tary defeat of the Hispano American War of 1897. 
As a consequence of th is war, Spam lost Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Phi l ip-
pines, the last colonies of i t s once vast empire. This war was called a 
"disaster" and was for Spain and i ts people an awakening from a dream of 
grandeur and past glory to the real i t ies of the modern l i f e in which Spain 
was s t i l l not i n i t i a ted . After the Treaty of Paris of 1898, where Spain 
o f f i c ia l l y lost the last remnants of i t s old glory, i t "humiliated" "returned 
2 
to i t s metropolitan frontiers of the end of the 400th.' 
The national "disaster" made many people realize what had been happening 
to Spain since the 17th century, i . e . , that i t was becoming poor, isolated, 
and old-fashioned. So, at the turn of the 19th century, Spain's intel l igentsia 
started speaking of a national reconstruction. This idea took two mam 
trends. One of the trends was that Spain should become "European!zed." One 
of the leaders of th is movement, Joaquin Costa, highly influenced Ortega's 
thought. Costa published an important book, Reconstitucion y Europeizacion 
de Espana (Reconstitution and Europeanization of Spain) (1900), in which he 
urged that the "regeneration" of Spam be accomplished through i t s European-
izat ion. Thus, his point is Spain in Europe, however, he is not clear enough 
in two points. One is that he did not explain to what extent this European-
ization should affect the national beliefs and tradit ions. He did not 
specify i f Spain were to submit cul tural ly to Europe or merely to adopt some 
of the European cultural views, while maintaining i ts idiosmcracy. The 
other point is that he could not clearly particularize which reforms Spain 
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should accomplish and how it should become Europeanized. Ortega solved 
these two puzzles, to some extent, by transferring them to an educational 
context. As a good pedagogue, Ortega considered as necessary, that any 
adaptation of the European thought must be accomplished within the Spanish 
framework and circumstance, and must be undertaken from Spain's point of 
view. For him, this adaptation and adoption of new ideas was an educational 
enterprise and should be guided by educational considerations. So, Ortega's 
answers to Costa's two puzzles are: one, that the changes to be carried 
out were from Spain's point of view; and two, that reform was educational 
matter. 
This idea of restoration permeated the intellectual life of Spain. It 
was also influential in the thought of the generation of 1898,6 usually 
•t 
referred toes the generation of '98 (Generacion del 98), and which is 
thought of as perhaps Spain's most important generation of the 20th Century. 
Even though the generation of '98 was influenced by the thought of 
national restoration, its members perceived it from different points of 
view. Some of them became "europeizantes" like Ortega, while others took 
the stand of Hispanization. Perhaps a good representative of this latter 
movement was Unamuno, one of the greatest essayists and writers of this 
generation and of all Spanish thought. His orientation was "inward," and 
o 
was expressed in his essay, Inwardness (Adentro). 
Ortega, Objectivism, and Spain 
Ortega cr i t ic ized Unamuno, and found his stand regarding Spain's 
culture too provincial and subjective. Our author, influenced by German 
philosophy,9 particularly Kant and Neokantism, was requesting the 
creation of new ideas to deal with the national problem. He wanted, then, 
not an emotional approach to the problem, but a scient i f ic and objective one, 
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one that could only be provided by a scientific method. This method should 
be taught to the Spanish society. In general, his ideas on how to educate 
Spain along that line are expressed as follows: (1) in "Asamblea para el 
Progreso de las Ciencias" ("Convention for the Progress of Science"), he 
suggested that the concept "Europeanization" should be defined. His definition 
is that it means "science." For our author it is precisely a "scientific" 
and rational attitude that represents Europe's main contribution to Western 
thought, and this is what Spain should look for in her search for "European-
11 
ization", (2) the import of science should be accomplished by teaching it 
to Spain's youth so as to have the "seeds" of that cultural element planted 
in Spain for good; (3) improve the university education, for which Ortega, 
at this early stage of his thought, seems to offer German education as 
12 
model; (4) foster in the mass of the people a higher idea of culture, one 
more intellectual; for this it is proposed inviting to Spain the great 
13 
European intellectuals representative of the different disciplines; 
(5) team work or cooperation among intellectuals; (6) orient the Spanish 
politics, not in a regional or nationalistic perspective, but in terms of a 
14 
universal one, (7) avoid conceiving the volkgeist, and the popular 
spontaneity, as the "cure" for Spain's problems; (8) introduce the Spanish 
16 
man to the critical habits of thought and to European science. 
This represents, in general, Ortega's ideas regarding Spain's European-
ization. What is particularly of interest in his program is the heavy 
interest in education. His point is that Europeanization would save Spain 
from its basic problem which is its "anachronism." He believed that the 
Spanish I, or personality, was "petrified" and shaped according to an old-
fashioned model. This causes its behavior to be disfunctional to the 
civilization of the 20th Century. Representative of this civilization are 
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the modern mathematics, physics, and philosophy of the beginning of the 
century. These are the elements of "European culture" which Spain needed 
to learn, and thus the problem, as Ortega saw it, was an educational one. 
But, as part of this educational package, Ortega wanted Spain to be national 
1 7 
and universal at the same time.1' He believed that science and knowledge 
were representative of universal elements of culture not ascribed to 
national frontiers. Thus, he thought also that Spain could learn the ideas 
that Europe had developed, without playing havoc to its national beliefs 
and sense of identity. 
What is underlying in this idea is Ortega's concept of Europe which, 
for him, is a "cultural concept," not a "geographical expression." So, 
Spain should not abandon the things distinguishing its national character 
like its "impressionism" and "sensualism." But these two cultural traits 
should be tamed by reason and thought for: "The use of conceptual thought 
has never been our strength"; and he also adds that his culture would be a 
"firm" ground for the spirit only if it "integrates" its "sensualism" to the 
cultivation of intellectual "meditation" or thought. 
But Ortega does not stop short in drawing these conclusions; he also 
points out that Spain should be an European "possibility." He examines 
18 
this idea in "Espana como Posibilidad" ("Spain as a Possibility"). While 
commenting on this in the book, Viaje a Espana (Journey to Spain) of Meier-
Graefe, our author says that Spain is a European possibility. This means 
that Spain has something to offer to Europe in exchange for its culture, 
and this is its youth and energy: "Europe, tired in France, exhausted in 
Germany, weak in England, will have a new youth under the powerful sun of 
our land."19 
53 
Education of the Masses and the Socialization of the School as a 
Pedagogical Resource and an Educational Aim 
In his writings of 1902-1910, we can see Ortega criticizing what he 
conceived as negative qualities of Spam and the Spaniards. In his descrip-
tion of Spain and the Spaniards, he said- Spain is a "no-nation" lacking a 
conscience of "historical continuity," it is "alienated," "culturally 
ignorant," and its higher education is a "shadow" of knowledge; regardinq 
the Spaniard, he conceives him as extremely "passionate," "fanatic," 
"casticista," "sensual"; he is also an "extreme materialist" fond, therefore, 
of "trivial" things, a man that would reject any "transcendental" or 
"abstract" idea. Accordingly, these negative, social and individual 
qualities, characteristic of the Spaniard, make him lack a "communal" 
20 
spirit, a "scientific" attitude and, therefore, "intellectual responsibility." 
In a pedagogical writing of 1910, "La Pedagogia Social como Programa 
Politico" ("Social Pedagogy as a Political Program"), Ortega analyzes 
again these national problems. In this writing, he emphasized a lack of 
"communal" spirit as a national problem, adding to it an extreme "personal!sm." 
This "personalism" causes an orientation toward the fulfillment of personal 
"fancies" and "desires," as the major aim of the public activity. This 
makes of Spain a nation divided in "atoms," and leaning toward "disintegration." 
After this diagnosis, Ortega is highly concerned about which idea of society 
and man should be fostered in his educational engineering. He wants an 
education fostering the national unity and available to all social groups. 
Socialization of the School 
According to Ortega, the process of education should make of man a 
laborer of culture, an idea which embraces everything "from digging the 
22 
ground to writing verses." Under this idea, education must be extended to 
the masses of the people including the workers who should be cultured through 
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education. Ortega criticized here, as inhuman, keeping a worker in the 
"corner of a workshop" without education, because this hindered his 
possibilities to grssp a general view of reality, one giving a "noble meaning 
to his work." This was the case in Spain, and in Europe, too; and he 
conceived this as a "crime" against humanity. This schooling system is 
criticized as working on a double standard of values, represented on one 
hand by the schools of the rich, and, on the other, by those of the poor. 
The result is a society of "cultured" and non-cultured men. Because of 
their education, the "cultured" people have the facility to control and 
exploit the rest of the population, throwing them into a situation where 
they become dehumanized. 
Our author conceives this double standard of values as "immoral" and 
believes that the dual system of education should be abolished. Besides 
the basic immorality of this system, Ortega also argues that the inequality 
is self-defeating because it disrupts social unity without which Spam, as 
a nation, would perish. 
From Adhesion to the European Thought to Its Criticism 
We have seen that Ortega wanted to bring the European ideas to Spain. 
This Europeanization, if we come to think of it, was, in some of its 
elements, a naive thought of the still young Ortega, But, later on, he 
seemed to become aware of this limitation of his thought. By 1925, he was 
already critical of Germany which earlier represented for him, one of the 
outstanding countries of the Europe he envisioned. He started to be critical 
of the German university, and, above all, of this country's ideology, 
23 
Fascism. 
Even before 1925, Ortega was already pointing out a crisis among 
Europeans. He viewed the 20th Century European man as willing to pursue his 
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activities in life without thinking personally and seriously about the 
meaning of what he was doing. For Ortega, this man seemed to care more 
about action than about thought, and Ortega viewed this as a "collapse of 
reason" in the European tradition. So, from formerly adhering to the 
European intellectual ways, Ortega began to become highly critical. For 
him, reason had been viewed as an effective and legitimate authority ever 
since Descartes; and this belief continued in the 19th Century, where it 
got its greatest prestige with the development of the natural sciences, and 
physics in particular. Ortega's point is that the "reasoned traditions" 
of the past came to be ignored. This was one of the sources of the major 
upheavals of our century: 
the source of the new art, the glorification of 
sport and the body, the cult of youth, and the24 
politics of direct action, especially Fascism. 
In the absence of reason as an effective authority to follow, people 
based their actions on the power of their arbitrary will. This suggests 
that people had substituted the power of the will fo*' reason which leads 
them toward the pursuit of the things themselves, though without a plan of 
action for their pursuit, without a reasoned concept explaining them. In 
the Revolt of the Masses (1930), Ortega had pointed to this as one of the 
characteristics of what he labels as the "mass Man," a man that does not 
value thought or science, but praises all the comfort provided by applied 
technology and science. Commenting on this point while interpreting Ortega, 
Robert McClintock says that the generation of 1933 preferred "volition to 
intellect."25 McClintock suggests that the failure of reason to maintain 
its standing in the minds of contemporary Europeans made them "disillusioned." 
They arbitrarily selected different features from their circumstances, 
exalting them and converting them into absolute realities. Their lives, 
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incapable of being oriented by reason, leaned toward the prosaic facts of 
state and party, 
"which would at least impose a totalitarian form on 
life, for slavery was preferable to intolerable chaos." 
For Ortega, it was no solution to impose volition and action on reason; 
this imposition over reason had to be reformed. At this moment of his 
intellectual development, Ortega seemed to realize that the criticism he 
was making of Spain's crisis of ideas could now be extended to Europe. 
Historical Reason, Ideas and Beliefs 
An element of this dimension of his thought, where he became critical 
of the European ways, was present in his analysis of the concepts of ideas 
and beliefs. He started this analysis formally in 1940 with his book, 
Ideas y Creencias (Ideas and Beliefs). This thought became more concrete 
later on in his conception of Historia como Si sterna (History as a System) 
(1941). 
Nonetheless, this critical thought already had been taking form since 
1923, with the publication of El Tema de Nuestro Tiempo (The Modern Theme). 
In this book, he states the importance of connecting his idea of life to 
that of reason, thereby making this latter "vital." He says that the "theme 
of our time" consists of shifting the attention from "pure reason" and a 
pure intellectualistic approach of knowledge, to one labeled as "vital" or 
27 
"historical" reason. Ortega is claiming the need for "pure reason" to give 
place to a "vital" type of reason, i.e., a reason as "localized" and with 
mobility and power of "self-transformation." ° In adhering to this idea, 
he wants to include the historical element in which reason is imbued as part 
of the elements, influencing man's perception of reality. Reqarding this 
point, Ortega says later, in his essay, "A Historia de la Filosofia de 
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Emile Brehier," ("To a History of Philosophy of Emile Brehier") (1942), that 
to think is to "dialogue" with the circumstance, also that an idea is always 
the "response" of a man to a particular instance of his l i f e . 
So, according to this thought, to understand an idea, i t is important 
to refer i t to the socio-histoncal circumstance in which i t was created. 
An idea is an action that man effectuates in terms of a 
particular circumstance and with a particular aim in 
mind. I f while analyzing an idea we omit the circumstance 
and purpose provoking i t , we w i l l only get of i t a vague 
and abstract p ro f i l e . 2 9 
Ortega thinks that his position suppresses in the European thought what 
he labels as extreme rationalism. This position considers an idea "non-
30 
localized" and valid for " a l l " ages and historical epochs. According to 
Ortega, such a conception leads to a c r i t i c a l situation when, for instance, 
inst i tut ions l ike the state or the school enacted under the insignia of reason, 
fa i l to serve man's purposes. Ortega's point is that rationalism with i t s 
concept of truth as " t rans-v i ta l , " "non-localized," or val id for " a l l " times, 
does not help Europe to solve i t s di f ferent social and po l i t ica l problems. 
For him a new idea of reason is needed, a historical reason coping with the 
dif ferent changes in society, and i ts dif ferent ins t i tu t ions; also, a reason 
capable of helping man to l ive his l i f e according not to universal and rational 
models of thought--!ike Kant's categorical imperative—for instance. The 
reason guiding man's l i f e , therefore, should be one recognizing the fact 
that man does not have a nature, but a history. Consequently, this reason 
would take into consideration that man changes, that his inst i tut ions change 
and, even though objective truth is universal and "indifferent to any v i ta l 
31 
consideration," when i t appears in my v i ta l horizon, i t is I who wi l l give 
i t i t s value and worth in my l i f e . Einstein's theory of re la t i v i t y , for 
instance, does not change due to the way I interpret i t or due to the uses 
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I put it to. However, it is true that the way man at a particular historical 
time confronts Einstein's theory, and the importance he gives to it, 
determines in many respects the impact of that theory on society and life in 
general. Notwithstanding his criticism of what he conceives as extreme 
rationalism, Ortega does not want to fall into irrational ism. He said in 
his article, "Ni Vitalismo m Racionalismo" (Neither Vitalism nor Rationalism) 
(1924), that he did not conceive of any other theoretical knowledge than the 
rational. (If we contrast this thouqht with that of Bergson, who followed 
an idea of vitalism, we can see that Berqson conceived of the possibility of 
a non-rational and, at the same time, vital theory; for our author, on the 
contrary, reason and theory cannot be conceived if not as synonymous.) 
Ortega's view on reason as vital is seen by some of his commentators as 
implying a different and sometimes new conception of reason or a "reform of 
reason." This view is shared by Ferrater Mora, one of Ortega's followers, 
and by Robert McClintock. Mora suggests that in Ortega there is a new and 
concrete idea of reason, and the recognition of the fact that, whatever a 
person thinks of reason, it is rooted always in his life; also, that reason 
is no more than a "simple function"; furthermore, he interprets reason in 
Ortega to be every such act of the intellect bringing us into contact with 
reality.33 
So, reason becomes "vital," i.e., circumstantial and historical, and it 
is related to man's concrete life, where all meaning takes place, be this 
theoretical or practical, Einstein's theory, a baseball game, or the fact 
that a student may be interested in philosophy. 
Robert McClintock, in his turn, emphasizes the importance of reason in 
man's particular life. He analyzes this point along the lines of a broader 
concept, that of the European intellectual crisis. In his analysis, he 
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points out that some of the problems of the European mind of the 20th Century 
34 
seemed to be rooted in the "stigma" that became associated with reason. 
One of the elements of this cr is is of reason in Europe was that i t became 
incapable of explaining man's l i f e . Europe, then, was endangered, for many 
35 of i t s better thinkers had turned away from the problems of man. Ortega's 
reform consisted precisely in making of reason an "organ" of l i f e , i . e . , 
putting i t at the service of l i f e . 
Historical Reason, L i fe , and Reason 
To understand how reason becomes reformed for being put at the service 
of l i f e , we have to remember that in th is thought, man's "essence" should 
not be sought in nature, but in history; "man . . . has no nature; what he 
has is . . . history." Accordinq to our author, man should be addressed 
by "v i ta l reason" instead of natural or pure reason. Historical reason 
leads us to the observation that, "the specif ically human rea l i ty . . . man's 
l i f e . . . is of historical consistency." 7 Ortega's philosophy of "v i ta l " 
or "historical reason," having found man as the center of rea l i t y , or as the 
"radical" or primary rea l i t y , would address the question of man's relation 
to knowledge, reason, and social inst i tut ions, in a particular way. He 
would ask not how man should relate to the social inst i tu t ions, but how 
these should relate to man. He makes the same analysis regarding thought 
and reason. 
Regarding thought and reason, Ortega says that we have to shi f t the 
focus that has been given to these ideas since their bir th in Descartes, 
who said, as we a l l know, " I think, therefore I am." This stressed the 
emphasis in thought in such a way that i t became a primary t ru th , necessary 
38 
to assert the second part of the formula, that of existence ("I am"). 
60 
Ortega, in his turn, shifts the Cartesian formula and says, "I think because 
I live."39 
Life as Action and as Reason 
This far we have seen how Ortega, after starting a criticism of Spain 
and trying to educate her through the process of Europeanization, ended 
criticizing Europe, its institutions, and its concept of reason. He thinks 
that Europe should reform its idea of reason. The reform that Ortega calls 
for regards, as we have seen, his criticism of rationalism. And his point 
is that rationalism does not make a proper analysis of man and his institu-
tions. Rationalism, understood as that form of optimistic thouqht that 
conceives as possible to know almost everything—as can be seen already in 
Descartes—worked quite well in the analysis of the world. However, when it 
tried to analyze and describe the reality of life, it failed. 
One of the failures of rationalism, as understood by Ortega, was that 
it put man at the service of culture, of knowledge and science, and at the 
service of the social institutions. According to Ortega, the extreme 
rationalist lives according to principles, and thinks that life should serve 
these principles. Ortega thinks of this as nonsensical and feels that this 
should not be the case. For him, it is obvious that we do not "live to 
think." It is the other way around, "we think, in order that we may succeed 
in surviving." This, according to him, sets him in opposition to some of 
the ideas that in the philosophical tradition relate to the function of 
knowledge. For instance, he says that thought was not given to man, once and 
for all, as a "faculty" or "power" (of which he can dispose) as was given 
flight to the birds and swimming to the fish. Man cannot just think "from 
the outset and without further ado," like the fish can swim. No, man cannot 
conceive of himself as rational in that sense as a "thinking thing" as 
61 
Descartes said, or a "rational animal," because man cannot be sure of 
exercising thought in an "adequate manner." In other words, man cannot be 
sure that he is real ly r igh t , that he "w i l l hit the mark." The real i ty is 
that thought is the product of an educational multi-millenary e f fo r t , i t is 
a "discipl ine" a "culture" or "cult ivat ion" accomplished " l i t t l e by l i t t l e , " 
for which we are responsible a l l the time, which we have to perform and 
achieve, with the proper u t i l i za t ion of the resources at hand, i . e . , the 
educational resources. And this education has to refer to the function of 
reason, to the concrete circumstance of man. In this sense, Ortega thinks 
his thought to represent an approach to reason dif ferent from what was 
t rad i t iona l ; and, in this sense, his concept of reason as " v i t a l , " i . e . , 
histor ical and circumstantial, represents a breath of fresh a i r blowing 
against some tradit ional interpretations of the function of the inte l lect 
and the aims of learning and knowledge. 
Following th is context, cognition appears as a 
historical phenomenon; not as a 'natural ' and 
therefore inevitable occupation of man in the 
course of history by way of answer to certain 
experiences and l iable to be dropped in view of 
others.41 
Intellectual ism, Byzantinism and Education 
Ortega wants modern man to be on the alert regarding the conception 
of reason followed. The att itude whereby thought and culture are conceived 
of as ends in themselves, at which service l i f e should be placed, he cal ls 
Byzantinism. Byzantinism represents a reversing of the true relation 
existing between culture and l i f e . Furthermore, i t represents an "aberration" 
which has been carried to an extreme for the last two centuries: under the 
name f i r s t of raison, then of enlightenment, and f i na l l y of culture, a 
62 
radical prevarication of terms, and the most indiscreet deification of 
intelligence were effected. For our author, this "aberration" or 
distortion of the true sense of intelligence and culture, was particularly 
true of Germany and, in this country, of Ortega's former teachers, Cohen 
and Natorp. Under this attitude thought, culture, had come to fill the 
"vacant" place of a God that had been put to flight. Ortega's criticism 
against this form of intellectualism is harsh; it represents, for him, 
putting life's aims and its activities at the service of culture, while at 
the same time culture is viewed as something so precious and inaccessible 
that it has to be acquired at a "jeweler's window." Then, most people would 
have no other choice than "doinq without it," i.e., doing without culture. 
The Byzantinism of culture does not give proper attention to reason and 
thought in the general structure of 1ife, because it put life at the service 
of these two concepts; thouqht and reason should be viewed as "tools" at 
the service of life, not the other way around. Then, within this context, 
reason becomes a fundamental element for the right conduct of life. And this 
is one of the fundamental elements of "vital" or "historical reason." For 
life to really achieve its true meaninq, it should be guided by reason. 
Ideas, Beliefs, Historical Reason and Education 
According to Ortega, one of the basic ways in which historical reason 
is put at the service of life is to analyze the different problems man is 
confronted by daily. Without this analysis, which implies a "strategic 
retreat" into the self and a "vigilant" thought, life is impossible. Part 
of this analysis is oriented to provide man with an interpretation of the 
world or circumstances. A qualitatively good life would not be possible 
without a good knowledge of the circumstances. It is due to this knowledge 
that the individual will know how to act in the circumstances. This makes 
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Ortega conceive one of the basic aspects of knowledge as "knowing how to 
act." When man knows what do do in his circumstances, when he knows the 
solutions to the basic problems he confronted in his life, he feels "secure." 
So, knowledge provides an element of comfort and security. This element of 
security is basically represented in culture, according to Ortega, by the 
system of ideas and beliefs generally guiding man's life. This system of 
ideas and beliefs tells man "what he can do," "what he cannot do," and 
43 "what he can expect" of his circumstances. To this end, he is forced to 
formulate "a program of conduct vis-a-vis each of them." This program of 
conduct telling man in what he can "rely" on with respect to the things in 
his surroundings, represents a rational interpretation labeled by Ortega as 
an "intellectual schema." 
Intellectual Schema, Ideas and Beliefs 
There are two moments in the formation of the "intellectual schema." 
In the first moment, there is an idea; in the second moment, there is the 
"intellectual schema" that can become a belief. When man confronts a problem 
in his life and finds that the solution--if any--offered to him by his 
culture does not help him, he may either deprive his life of that for which 
he felt a necessity, or he can try to invent a solution. To invent a 
solution, for which will be created an "intellectual schema," the individual 
needs a "strategic retreat" into the self and a "vigilante" thought. This 
can be accomplished by what Ortega labels as "ensimismaniento" (turning 
inward). Man has the capacity of turning his back on the perpetual harass-
ment of the environment and turnmq his attention to his own inwardness. 
This activity has usually been called thinking or contemplation; and, for 
Ortega, it represents the turning away from the world of things to that of 
ideas: "...the inwardness of man...is principally made of ideas."45 
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But neither the ideas nor the capacity to go inside himself, taking his 
stand within himself, are gifts conferred upon man. Since man is not a 
"rational animal" just like that, it costs him great effort to really 
provide good solutions to his problems. It is by his effort, his toil, and 
his ideas that man has succeeded in reactinq upon thinqs, in transforminq 
them, and "creating around himself a margin of security."46 This "margin 
of security" is particularly provided by technology, which is viewed here 
as the instrument created by man to facilitate his life-m-the-world. 
After the "intellectual schema" or idea is formed, 1f it is a real 
solution offering a new or different way of dealing with some problematic 
situation of the circumstances, it may be adopted by the social group and 
become a belief. Julian Marias says that a good illustration of an idea 
that became a belief is the idea of progress. This was born in the 18th 
Century as part of the concept of the capacity of science to go step by 
step, unfolding truth. Already in the 19th Century, this idea was a belief. 
That is, people became convinced that progress in the discovery of or search 
for truth was something automatic, i.e., it is part of the process by which 
man's intelligence relates to reality. It should be interesting to note in 
the case of this belief in progress that the same has been questioned 
today. Ortega himself has done so, in, among other works, his Revolt of 
the Masses. 
Ideas and Beliefs, Social Change, and Education 
It is important in Ortega to have a picture of the social and historical 
situation in which ideas are born to really understand their historical and 
social meaning. One of the basic elements to be analyzed along this line 
is how ideas and beliefs relate to each other. For our author, the inter-
relationship between ideas and beliefs plays an important role in the 
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historical and social change. Ortega says, "no human achievement can be 
rightly understood without an analysis of the unquestioned beliefs that 
silently, invisibly, operate at the back of the human mind.48 So, to under-
stand the meaning and function of an idea in a particular social group and 
historical situation, we have to set it into the background of the beliefs 
in which it was born. Commenting on this, Christian Ceplecha says: 
When these beliefs fail man, or when a situation arises 
for which man has no beliefs, he must search for some 
support; and he does this by means of thinking. He 
must then invent new ideas and try them out.49 
So, the ideas come to fill up the holes regarding the interpretation of 
reality that the beliefs leave open. According to Ortega, this process of 
change can sometimes take centuries, particularly in the case of fundamental 
beliefs of the culture;50 some other times, important changes in beliefs 
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can be produced in the time span of a generation, say, fifteen years. 
But in either case, what is basic to know is that changes in social beliefs 
and their substitution by ideas produce delicate as well as important 
effects in the structure of the social Weltanschauung. (As we noted above, 
Ortega did not seem to be completely aware in his initial Europeanization 
stage of all the consequences for importing ideas from one social context 
to another. When this thought became more sociologically mature, he seemed 
to become aware of the perils inherent in this importation of European ideas 
into Spain.) So, drastic changes in the belief system would imply changes 
m the "basic structure" and "ground" of the life of a society, even changes 
in the conception of the structure of reality.52 The social engineer, the 
philosopher, and the pedagogue, have then to be very careful regarding the 
importation of ideas, particularly from one social context to another. It 
could happen that, instead of helpinq, new ideas, if imposed indiscriminately, 
could have very negative and harmful consequences. Commenting on this, 
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Ortega said in "Un_ Capitulo Sobre la Cuestion de como Muere una Creencia" 
("A Chapter Concerning the Death of a Belief") (1954), that 
at the beginning ideas are destructive forces because 
they uproot men from one belief or another, and 
finally, with time, could destroy all the beliefs of 
a nation.53 
The consequences produced by the death of the cultural beliefs, without 
having meaningful ideas substituting for them, produce a state of "demoral-
ization" of "stupidity"; man's life becomes a vacuum, and his humanity 
becomes "degraded"; "you cannot expect from such men the production of 
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science nor of true poetry or true relition." 
Already in "Rectificacion de la Republica" ("Rectification of the 
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Republic") (1931), Ortega was suggesting "not to imitate" other countries, 
since their social circumstances were different and called for particular 
ideas to solve their problems. 
Before finishing this part of this chapter, I want to introduce a 
criticism made by Ortega of the ideas and beliefs conducting the pedagogical 
thought of Europe. In this article, he warns the Spanish readers regarding 
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the pedagogy of one of the leading German pedagogues, Kershensteiner. 
He suggests that the pedagogues should analyze the ideas and beliefs on which 
they base their education. They should make a special effort to be at the 
"height of the times" in their educational ideas. Ortega's idea is that, 
traditionally, education has been fifty years behind in the knowledge of 
the ideas taught at school. His point is that, generally, the pedagogue is 
not the creator of the ideas that will direct the thought expressed in his 
pedagogy; the pedagogue has received them from his masters, therefore, from 
the thought of a previous generation. A book written in 1922 by Keishen-
steiner, for instance, reflects the ideas of 1890. Furthermore, since a 
long campaign is needed so that the ideas expressed in the book written in 
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1922 reach the school, it happens that its doctrines will not really be 
effective till 1940 or so. We reach the "grotesque" situation where the 
children of 1940 
"are taught according to the ideas of 1890 and that 
the school that supposedly should prepare the student __ 
for his future life, lives usually back two generations. "t>' 
Along this line, he points out how Kershensteiner's pedagogy—one of the 
greatest European pedagogues of 1922—represents the ideas of 1890. This 
is viewed in the analysis of the ideas and beliefs sustaining Kershensteiner's 
pedagogy. Ortega first analyzed the aim of this pedagogue's education: and 
he found out that, for him, "the aim of education is to educate useful 
citizens." This idea was in vogue during 1890, as a result of a "political 
interpretation of man and history." According to Ortega, this interpretation 
still followed the influence of Kant, Hegel, Comte, and Stuart Mill, in the 
conception of the human life, and in its historical development as a 
"preparation for the conquest of political freedom and a certain juridical 
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order named the state." This form of thought had already started its 
"ebb-tide" at the beginning of the 20th Century. To insist on it, from the 
part of Kershensteiner, was a sign of "anachronism." Instead, what should 
have been insisted was the elimination of such pedagogy; pedagogy should not 
"be adapted to politics," to the idea of the State, because, "tomorrow, when 
the children become mature men, the State for which they were educated would 
have changed."59 
Some Critical Remarks Regarding Ortega's Conception of Ideas and Beliefs 
Ortega seems to demand that the pedagoques be careful regarding the 
place of ideas and beliefs in education. As was explained in the preceding 
pages, his thought underwent a process of intellectual maturation. He passed 
from a too broad importation of European ideas into Spain, to a more discreet, 
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moderated and critical stance. This last stage demanded well planned social 
institutions and goodindividuals. This could be conceived of as being 
particularly true for education which, supposedly, is an important element 
in the preparation of future generations for their task of conducting a 
social life. So, Ortega wants educators to be critical of the ideas and 
beliefs sustaining their pedagogy, but he does not offer them a solution on 
how to go about making this analysis. In this sense, his thought becomes 
perhaps general and sometimes vague. An instance of this imprecision is 
seen in the fact that he does not establish with clarity where to place 
ideas and beliefs in education. It is true that he suggests that we prepare 
our students to be at the "height of the times," in the sense of being 
knowledgeable about the ideas in use in the social and cultural medium. 
But, on the other hand, he also suggests that beliefs conform to a basic 
element of the "ground" and stratum of our life, which influences our ideas 
and which should be taken into consideration in any intellectual analysis. 
So, he does not seem sufficiently clear as to what stance the educator 
should take in education, whether that of beliefs or of ideas. If we compare 
this position with, for instance, that of Dewey, we have in the latter, in 
his book, The Quest for Certainty, his statement that we should be clear 
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enough as to take the side of ideas and science. And, as Dewey noted in 
regard to this point, pedagogues should be as clear as possible regarding 
their stance toward ideas and beliefs and their role in education. If we 
lean too strongly toward the preservation of beliefs, our education will 
become too traditional. I personally think that education should give 
particular importance to ideas; for, m many respects, it has been the power 
of science and knowledge which has shaped the modern mind. Of course, we 
cannot forget that education and social engineering should be put at the 
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service of man. In this way, we are following what the philosopher of 
science, Gerard de Gree, said once in his book: 
The sciences cannot tell the individual which position 
he ought to take or which consequences he should seek 
or avoid. But these, perhaps, are the most important 
questions that each individual must decide for himself. 
For it 1s through these choices and commitments that he 
finds the personal meaning of his life and the basis of 
responsibility for his acts.61 
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revelation to conduct his life. By the middle of the 15th century, this 
belief started fading away: "That living faith is clearly seen to have 
changed to a tired, ineffective faith." The 15th and 16th centuries were, 
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basic belief in revelation, which had been effective for so many centuries, 
had vanished. However, Western man was "saved" by a new set of ideas that 
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DUMaking reference to this point, Dewey says- "when we come to the 
bearing of special conclusions upon the conduct of social life, we are, 
outside of technical fields, at a loss. The force of tradition and dogmatic 
authority is due, more than to anything else, to precisely this defect". 
Were there any consensus as to the significance of what is known upon beliefs 
about things of ideal and general value, our life would be marked with 
integrity instead of by distraction and by conflict of competing aims and 
standards . . . The situation defines the vital office of present philosophy. 
It has to search out and disclose the obstructions; to criticize the habits 
of mind which stand in the way ... to interpret the conclusions of science 
with respect to their consequences for our beliefs about purposes and values 
in all phases of life." See, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Capricorn 
Books, 1960), pp. 312-313. 
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blSee De Gree, Gerard, Science as a Social Ins t i tu t ion , (New York: 
Doubleday and Co., 1955), p.~4X 
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CHAPTER IV 
ORTEGA'S PEDAGOGICAL IDEAS 
In this chapter, I will introduce and analyze what I consider Ortega's 
basic pedagogical ideas. I will also make a critical evaluation of some 
of his strong and weak points. The basic concepts to be treated are: 
The aims of childhood education and the place of the child in education; 
Education is not for adaptation; Child life and adult life; Some critical 
remarks and evaluation; About the student and studying; Immediate and 
mediate necessity and the student; Studying and teaching as deceitful 
activities; A reform of pedagogy; Mission of the university, life, the 
typical or average student, and the principle of economy of knowledge; 
The faculty of culture; The faculty of culture and general knowledge; The 
faculty of culture, the transmission of knowledge, and the preparation of 
professionals; The university should be also science. 
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The Aims of Childhood Education and the Place of the Child in Education 
At the end of the preceding chapter we saw how Ortega, in his article, 
"Pedagogia y Anacronismo" (Pedaqogy and Anachronism) (1922), criticized 
Kershensteiner's idea that the child should be educated for an idea of the 
State. Ortega says that instead the child should be educated for life. 
This idea is discussed with some detail in Biologia y Pedagogia (Biology and 
Pedagogy) (1920). The basic point of this book is that child education 
should be centered in the child qua child. It should not thus conceive 
childhood as a deficient or limited state of human life which should be 
overcome as soon as possible. Neither should childhood be viewed as a state 
to be trained for such utilitarian ends as servmq the community or society. 
In making this last point, Ortega, as he did with Kershensteiner, is reputing 
the pedagogical ideas of Antonio Zozaya, a Spanish pedaqogue. Zozaya, for 
instance, criticized teaching Don Quixote in the elementary school, arguing 
that this text was not related to the student's life; his point was that 
education should serve life, should be oriented toward the child's life. 
Since the reading of Don Quixote does not create competency or develop any 
skill in the child for this purpose, then, its reading should be deleted 
from the curriculum. 
Ortega agrees that this reading should be deleted from the curriculum 
for it does not serve the child's life but his reasons differ from those of 
Zozaya. Let us discuss this. 
What Zozaya considers as education for the purpose of life is aimed 
at its utilitarian dimension. He wants the child to know what a train is, 
a factory, and so on, so that he becomes fully aware of their social and 
economic functions. Such an education would make the child frt_ into the 
adult world early in his life, supposedly quaranteeinq his survival in the 
78 
struggle for life. 
For Orteqa, this is a mistake. What is important is not to teach the 
child to know the importance of this kind of "real" life. It may be true 
that such knowledge may be useful, but the point is that its learninq by the 
child should not constitute the aim of his education. If "everything" could 
be taught to the child, then these matters could constitute part of a 
curriculum, aimed at the child's education. But the important thinq to do 
is teaching what is fundamental or "essential" in a child's education. At 
this point the pedagogue confronts what Ortega labels as the "educational 
problem" which is always one of "elimination," i.e., there is so much to 
learn that the curriculum should be reduced to the bare essentials. In the 
case of childhood education, this problem becomes more acute. Now, what 
should be the "essentials" of this education? For Orteqa, this seems to be 
a problem in which the science of psychology could be of great help; what 
should be taught may depend upon that which is determined to be "the 
essential function" of the child's psychic life. Child education should be 
oriented toward this psychic nucleus. 
There are three elements that should be related to this basic psychic 
nucleus of the child's life: civilization, culture, and spontaneity. Of 
these, Ortega stresses "spontaneity" which is defined as the child's "primary 
life." The child should be educated so as to orient him toward the natura 
naturans or creative life. Secondary and higher education should later on 
take care primarily of the teachinq concerning culture and civilization. 
Ortega's point is that we should not hinder the child's "primary life." 
The elements of this primary life are described as- courage, curiosity, 
love, hatred, intellectual keenness, search for fun and achievement, 
confidence in himself and in the world, imagination, memory. It is this 
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primary and spontaneous life with which we should be mainly concerned. 
Ortega thus rejects the idea of curtailing the child's life and 
spontaneity for the sake of an utilitarian notion of education like that of 
Zozaya. The idea is that a life rich in spontaneity and creativity would 
produce in its turn a richer culture and civilization. "I ask for an en-
richment of the spontaneous and creative life, precisely, for the enrichment 
of culture and civilization." This does not mean that this pedagogy will 
leave the child on his own, without direction; this "vital spontaneity" 
ought to be "analyzed," "multiplied," "equilibrized," and its "deformations 
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corrected." 
Education is Not for Adaptation 
Another of the pedagogical considerations and a corollary of the idea 
of an education for life is the idea that childhood education should not be 
solely concerned with adaptation to the socio-economic medium, or to an idea 
of the school. Such a pedagogy for "adaptation" would be also basically 
utilitarian. Its effect would be that of killing the child's "willpower," 
"vitality," and "imagination," the foundations of his creativity. This 
o 
happens when the child's capacity to "desire," is conditioned in such a way 
that he is made to want and like what the teacher and the system conceive as 
good for him. This will weaken in the child the capacity to "desire" and to 
experiment and search for new things. 
Ortega opposes any utilitarian pedagogy aiming at an adaptation to the 
social, or natural, medium (or that of the school) on the part of the 
student. For him, the medium should also be adapted to the organism; as he 
says, "Not only the organism adapts itself to the medium but also the medium 
4 
adapts itself to the organism." 
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Child Life and Adult Life 
Still another of the basic mistakes of traditional education and of its 
pedagogy of "adaptation to the medium" is its misunderstanding of what is 
the child's reality, "we judge the child's behavior, his acts, conceiving 
him as immersed in the same medium of the adult." Consequently, we will 
conceive him as "clumsy" and his childhood as a "sickly," "defective" life 
state, in preparation for adulthood. This has made of pedagogy an attempt 
to reduce the child's "puerility" as one of its aims, introducing in him as 
much dosis of adult life as possible. This is intended by way of adapting 
the child to the ideal of mature man current m our time. 
Instead, a "reverse" of this trend should be sought.7 Ortega wants us 
not to educate the child in view of an ideal of an exemplar man, but, 
by its own standard of puerility . . . the best man is 
never the one that was less of a child, but on the 
contrary: the one that after thirty years finds in his 
heart the most splendid treasure of childhood.8 
We have to fight the idea that each staqe in man's maturation suppresses the 
previous one, therefore, that maturity brings along with it the disappearance 
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of childhood in man. We should see in maturity, then, not the "suppression" 
but the "integration" of childhood. Nonetheless, this will be difficult due 
to the rooted belief in what is "utilitarian" in our social institutions. 
Only if this utilitarian character of our education takes a shift could it 
produce a new stock of better citizens in our society, with that vital 
joviality so frequently found in the wise man and in the true man of science. 
A vitalistic pedagogy guided by a new idea of life has to be creative, 
spontaneous, and should follow a sportive and festival sense of life and not 
an utilitarian one. 
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Following Ortega's ideas, even i f a chi ld t r ied , he could not real ly 
understand, as Zozaya wanted, the practical dimension of a newspaper, of a 
t ra in , or of a factory, or how these things may be beneficial for his future 
l i f e . The child cannot understand the adult's world because he perceives 
real i ty d i f ferent ly . For him, for instance, what is "desirable" and "ideal" 
is preferred to the "real" world of the adult. Pedagogy, therefore, should 
depart from the concrete child circumstance and educate from the chi ld's 
perspective. I f the contrary is done, i . e . , i f the chi ld is forced to f i t 
into the adult's patterns, education w i l l not only be destroying the chi ld's 
l i f e , but hampering the possibi l i t ies of the formation of a happier and more 
creative future adult. To be pragmatic and u t i l i t a r i an is important for the 
development of a good l i f e , but this w i l l not be helped by teaching a young 
student about the world of the adults. Another point to consider, according 
to Ortega, is that any "u t i l i t a r ian" pedagoqy, as in the case with a l l 
"ut i l i tar ianism," presents too narrow a concept of rea l i t y , because i t 
focuses only in developing some concrete sk i l l s while leaving the formation 
of the complete man as something fu t i l e and with no practical entailment. 
Within such a narrow context, areas of knowledge l ike art and general culture 
would be seen as non-practical and worthless of their e f for t : 
Uti l i tar ianism surely provides more acuteness to perceive 
certain things but i t does i t narrowing the vi ta l horizon. 
The more detached we are of practical interests, the 
broader and more complex become our circumstance.11 
This, in consequence would hinder the development of a well-educated 
individual and society. 
Some Cri t ical Remarks and Evaluation 
Ortega seems to be at the "height of the times" in his pedagogical 
ideas, at least, i f we compare him with Zozaya. As a matter of fact, Ortega 
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mentioned that he was alone in his educational stand and that his ideas 
would be "misunderstood" by his contemporaries. But he was not really alone 
in his educational claims. Before him, Rousseau had made his claims for a 
spontaneous and "negative" education where the categories of the adult life 
and of the current culture should not be imposed on the child. This was a 
brilliant Rousseaunian idea that seemed to influence Ortega's thought as well 
as the thought of many other educators. Commenting on this, C. J. Kaner 
says in his Man, Society, and Education, that Rousseau initiated a revolution 
in Western educational thought, a revolution of the "heart." This 
"revolution" influenced educators of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries; 
educators who, without ignoring the interests of society, 
tended to place greater emphasis on the needs of the 
individual than on the needs of organized society, and 
thus they usually represented a revolt against the formal 
institutions and traditions of the established social 
system.13 
Ortega was in the trend of the educators searching for a renewal of traditional 
education and, in his search, we notice that his ideas go beyond the 
frontiers of Spain and relate to those of the "revolutionary" educators of 
Europe and America. Along this line we can place his criticism of the 
utilitarian view of education. Another contemporary author commentinq on 
this idea and of the "right" of the child to be himself is Ray Hemminqs in 
The Children's Freedom. This book is a study of A. S. Summerhill's edu-
cational ideas as were expressed in his Summerhill project. Hemminqs says 
that the child's environment should not be "constructed" educationally so 
as to "produce needs" of the particular kinds which the school may want him 
to feel, so as to provide society with the right persons for its needs; 
people with certain skills, knowledge and character structure, fitting 
perfectly with the needs, for instance, of the corporate state. If these 
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"needs" are developed in the student, what usually happens is that the 
student's true interests do not really develop and the potentialities 
fostered become only "those which are approved of and felt to be worthwhile 
by some other authority or perhaps by general social consensus." As we 
have seen, Ortega, the same as Hemmings, did not want this to happen. He 
preferred fostering a creative and self-directed person as we have seen in 
this chapter, and earlier. In this sense, some of Ortega's basic pedagogical 
ideas still seem to be valid. One of these ideas deals with the interesting 
concept of the relation of the student to the studying activity. Other 
ideas are what Ortega labels as the "principle of economy of knowledqe," 
and of the mission of the university. Let us discuss them in the following 
pages. 
About the Student and Studying 
I will analyze, in this part of the essay, the article "Sobre el 
Estudiar y el Cstudiante" ("On Studyinq and on the Student") (1932), which 
deals with the relationship between studying and the student, and the 
inherent paradoxical situation in this relationship whereby some elements in 
the activity of studying imply a falsification of knowledge and of learning. 
This falsification relates directly to Orteqa's idea of knowing and learning 
as spontaneous activities and creative endeavors of life. According to 
this thought, the activity of studyinq has, as one of it: basic elements, 
that of being a "false" activity, a "deception." Ortega's point is that 
the activity of studying introduces the student to certain knowledge and 
certain truths that he did not discover and, many times, not even know about. 
That is, he is introduced to an intellectual world that is not of his own 
and that has not been of his concern. The disciplines that the student 
finds as part of the intellectual and cultural heritage are there because 
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they were created by some men that "needed" them. The truths contained in 
these disciplines were in general the product of an intentional search 
accomplished by a man or a group of men that, "for one reason or another 
15 
could not do without them." So, the search for these truths, and their 
acceptance as good by a group of men, represents for Ortega that, "what they 
found was adequate to the need they felt."1 Within this context, a truth 
is discovered when "we have found a certain thought that satisfies an 
intellectual need which we have previously felt."17 
The point intended here is that a truth, to be sought, should represent 
an existential or vital need in the life of a person or a group. 
Immediate and Mediate Necessity and the Student 
According to Ortega, there are two kinds of necessities: one that is 
immediate and the other mediate. The immediate is felt as a "necessity of 
my own," that is, born within me, "autochtonous" and "authentic." Instances 
of this can be when I feel the "need of walking," or that of studyinq 
philosophy. The mediate necessity is that imposed from outside, like a 
traffic light or a policeman that commands one to stop. And this represents 
an ambivalent situation which portrays the student's relation to studyinq. 
The student is that someone on whom life imposes a need, the need to 
study. He has to study sciences which he finds already made and for which 
he does not feel a necessity. Putting aside some "exceptional" cases, the 
student, in general, may feel a "vague" and general necessity to study 
"something," "to know," and be instructed. Such general, vague, and mediate 
interest in knowledge cannot lead to the creation of any science. Not even 
"curiosity" on the part of a student that may wish to know "something" could 
really lead to knowledqe, again because of its generality and vagueness. 
And the situation gets even worse when the student's vague desires for 
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knowledge are confronted by the concrete and technical knowledge of the 
different careers made up of individual disciplines with their connection 
to this science or that. 
Studying and Teaching as Deceitful Activities 
As has been said, the typical student does not feel the direct need of 
a science that his predecessors felt. So, when he enqages in studying, he 
is dealing with a "dead need and a false activity";18 and in such a situation, 
his learning attempts cannot lead to true knowing. This is one of the most 
disturbing aspects of pedagogy, and a reform of education should start 
dealing with this problem. In so doing, it has to be understood that the 
activity of teaching, like that of studying, has a "constant," "habitual," 
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and "tolerated" element of falsity in it. 
In the teaching-learning activity, it is common, particularly in the 
case of the "typical" student, that many times neither teaching nor learning 
takes place. Ortega thinks that if the student does not learn, for whatever 
reason, the professor cannot truly say that he is teachinq. This is not a 
statement to be accepted as truth without some argument; nonetheless, one 
cannot help asking if teaching is really taking place in such a situation, 
at least a teaching that could be called effective. 
There is a real tragedy in all this, and almost any educator knows how 
few students can be said to really learn from his teaching. So, we have 
a situation whereby a "terrible gap" has developed in our modern culture 
between the "sad" activity which is studying and the "admirable" endeavor 
which is true knowing. This is a gap "between living culture, genuine 
knowledge, and the ordinary man"2 or student. The student does not feel 
the urge or vital need to know what he is taught, what he studies. As can 
be guessed, this leads to a situation whereby the culture supposedly taught 
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and learned "hangs in mid-air and has no roots of sincerity in the averaqe 
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man." In other words, culture becomes something "imposed," or "strange," 
as well as "unintelligible" and unreal." So, we have the situation of a man 
that has received certain knowledge and culture without truly assimilating 
it. 
According to Ortega, when the process of knowing was different in the 
sense of being more elemental, shorter, and organic, it was better assimilated. 
That is, the typical student and the common man felt this knowledqe closer 
to himself and his life, and he could assimilate and even recreate it. So, 
by comparison, and paradoxically, the contemporary common man is more un-
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cultured than was "the man of a hundred years ago." This 1s one of the 
vexing paradoxes of these past few decades, i.e., enormous progress in culture 
in our highly specialized and technical society has not produced an equally 
advanced and cultured man. 
A Reform of Pedagogy 
What should be done to solve the puzzle of studying and the student? 
And what of the problem of an uncultured common man in the midst of a super-
production of knowledge? Ortega's answer to this problem in this text about 
the student and studying is that we should reform pedagogy. Nonetheless, 
I find that his solution for reform as expressed in this text is too vague 
and bordering in sheer rhetoric. First of all, he suggests that the puzzle 
of the student and studying cannot be solved by eliminating the activity of 
studying or that of the search for knowledge and science. These activities 
cannot be eliminated because Western man has depended heavily on them, if 
only for his own survival. If a whole generation were to quit studyinq, the 
quality of life would drop drastically and many people would probably die 
a violent death. It seems that we need special knowledge and sophisticated 
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techniques to keep our kind of Western civilization alive. The question 
to answer, then, is, "How should we make studying attractive and felt as a 
necessity?" This is not a simple task because it is not easy to make the 
student realize and feel as his own the necessity for science, i.e., to 
pretend it is needed within himself. And even if he could pretend to like 
or want it, this would not be good enough to make him really learn a new 
science or area of knowledge. Ortega says that it is necessary to "genuinely" 
and "spontaneously" feel its need; "only then will I understand the answers 
it gives or tries to give,"23 and he adds, "No one can thoroughly understand 
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an answer unless he has understood the question to which it replies." 
"But," we ask, "How can one feel the need for something which, at first 
impression, usually renders itself to us as useless and so many times void of 
meaning or interest?" Ortega's solution to the pedagogical puzzle is that 
teaching should be turned around, and one should teach that, "fundamentally, 
teaching is only the teaching of a need for the science and not the teaching 
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of the science itself, whose need the student does not feel." This is his 
answer to the puzzle of the student and studying. And it is such an answer 
which I find vague and not clear, even to the point of begging the question. 
I interpret Ortega as saying here that we should make the student realize 
the practical need of knowing certain knowledge or science. If we cannot 
make the student learn certain knowledge for its own sake, we could teach 
him and make him understand the need he has for that knowledge. But would 
not this be something as abstract and devoid of true meaning as is the 
situation of learning a science whose necessity we do not feel? We think 
that to be the case; furthermore, if we cannot feel the necessity for a 
science, how can we be taught to feel the necessity of its necessity? 
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Perhaps Ortega should have related the paradoxical element of studying, 
i.e., its necessity versus its uselessness, to the notion of "vocation"26 
as a solution to the puzzle. That is, if one studies that subject matter 
which one likes, for being related to one's vocation, the probabilities are 
that one will actually learn the discipline while at the same time enjoying it. 
Nonetheless, this will be true more in the case of the graduate students who 
can join those programs and take those curricula more akin to their antici-
pated vocation and to their vital interests. It has to be mentioned, 
therefore, that this would not be a true solution, since the graduate 
students constitute a small minority of the student population; consequently, 
they are not representative of the typical student. 
We end this text--"Studying and on the Student"—without having found 
a real solution from Ortega to the problems entailed by the student engaged 
in the activity of studying. Perhaps we could find some value in his analysis 
in the sense that he makes us confront again a problem of great difficulty 
in pedagogy; the problem of motivation, for which, as we know, there are no 
simple solutions. 
There is another pedagogical text, The Mission of the University (1930), 
in which Ortega tackles again the problem of the student as related to the 
activity of studying and learning. This time, however, his analysis is more 
to the point and his suggestions are quite interesting pedagoqically. 
Mission of the University, Life, the Typical or Average Student, and the 
Principle of Economy of Knowledge 
In this text Ortega deals with what he labels as the mission of the 
university. One of the important elements of this mission is to put 
knowledge at the service of life and to consider the average or typical 
student as one of the basic centers of attention of the university. This 
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means that the university should prepare this student for life and make of 
him a "cultured" man placed at the "height of the times." 
How could the university prepare such a cultured man, particularly as 
we saw before, when he sees knowledge as useless and when the explosion of 
knowledge is so overwhelming? In trying to tackle this problem, Ortega will 
focus in this text on the second part of the question, rather than on the 
first, as he had done before. Thus, he will introduce an interesting concept, 
namely, the "principle of economy in education" or, as Ernest Becker puts it 
in his book, Beyond Alienation, and paraphrasing Ortega- the principle of 
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"economy of knowledge." With this principle, "we can make the universi^ 
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a locus of mass education, without the great danger of mass education." 
According to Becker, education should avoid diluting the elite nature of 
excellent knowledge. We should distinguish then between good education for 
the masses, and mass education. The former implies an excellent education 
which will be offered to the mass of the people. The latter, on the contrary, 
could represent an education devoid many times of good quality. For Becker, 
the principle of "economy of knowledge" could help furnish such an oppor-
tunity of good education for the masses. 
This principle of economy of knowledqe, Ortega takes from the Swedish 
economist Gustave Cassel. This economist conceived of a "principle of 
scarcity" as directing the economic activity; in other words, since there is 
not "unlimited abundance," we have to organize and control our resources, 
which leads us to the creation of a science of economics. An analogous 
situation seems to be the case in education. One could ask then, why is 
pedagogy both an occupation and a preoccupation of man? The answer to this 
is "scarcity": the student has a "limited" capacity for learning, and also 
the time to be allotted for studies is limited. In front of this scarcity, 
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we have a strong need for knowledge and the development of certain skills 
so as to live a life of freedom, with assurance of a good life. Orteqa 
notes that, 
Scarcity of the capacity to learn is the cardinal 
principle of education. It is necessary to provide 
for teaching precisely in proportion as the learner 
is unable to learn.29 
According to Ortega, there has been historically a correlation between two 
elements in the development of education as a pedagogical activity. These 
two elements are the ferment and expansion of education with that of the 
expansion and increment of "active" human knowledge. An instance of this 
correlation happened during the Eighteenth Century and has been increasing 
ever since. During that time, the first qreat burst of modern culture 
ripened, and life was turning full swing toward the "new" capitalism which 
had been made possible by recent inventions. In general, life during this 
Eighteenth Century started assuming a new and appalling intricacy which 
demanded greater equipment of techniques. This shift into a more complex 
and literate society demanded learnmq a quantity of things that went beyond 
the capacity to learn under ordinary circumstances; so pedagogy was intensi-
fied and expanded to meet that need. 
In sum, we have accordingly a correlation between the need for a 
science of education and the explosion of knowledge. So, we have the 
concrete problem that our generation of students cannot possibly learn all 
that we should like them to know. This leads Ortega to establish his concept 
of "economy of education" and set it up as a principle guiding the science of 
30 
teaching, its methods and its institutions. One of the problems of today's 
university, as we know, is the great variety of subject matter to be taught 
as part of the curricula for professional careers. Together with this, we 
have the students' need for a fairly good view of the general culture. 
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Each one of these two aspects is more than enough to keep any student busy 
for quite awhile. So, the answer of how to organize our pedagogical 
ac t iv i ty , suggests Ortega, is through his principle of "economy of education," 
Accordingly, the pedagogue should "economize in the subject matter to be 
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offered." But this is not enough: and here comes perhaps the most 
important implication of our pr inciple: 
The organization of higher education, the construction 
of the university, must be based upon the student, and 
not upon the professor or upon knowledge.32 
This means, following again Ernest Becker's interpretation of Ortega's 
pedagogical thought, that the university 
would teach knowledge at the "height of the times," 
the best se l f -c r i t i ca l and social c r i t i ca l knowledge. 
And in order to do th is , in order to give the really 
" v i t a l " ideas of the age, the university would have to 
be run by students, for students: they would direct 
i t s internal ordering, impose discipl ine, be responsible 
for morale, guide their own self-development.33 
According to th is , i t is absurd to consider the university as had been the 
case hitherto, as the "professor's house," a place where the professor 
receives pupils. I t should be the other way around, and the "torso" of the 
university should be conceived as constituted by the student body, "comple-
34 mented by the faculties of professors. 
This idea of the university as "based" on the student, as being "the 
or 
projection of the student to the scale of an ins t i tu t ion , " has two 
dimensions: f i r s t , the idea of the student conceived as someone with limited 
learning capacity; and second, the idea that the student needs some concrete 
professional and general knowledge to assure him l iv ing a future good l i f e . 
A university centered on the student should, therefore, prepare a 
curriculum with absolute "stringency" and take as i ts central portion that 
subject matter that a good "ordinary" student could really learn. To 
accomplish this commitment, a pedagogy of the university is needed. The 
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basic idea regarding this pedagogy of higher learning would follow the 
principle of economy of education which proposes teaching not what ideally 
ought to be taught, but what can be learned. But if this is the case, would 
the student have a chance of learning the basic culture of his time. Ortega 
thinks that there is no contradiction between this idea and that of teaching 
the average student the basic elements of the culture of the time. None-
theless, to unite these two considerations, a rationalization of the methods 
of instruction should be made; one that would economize on what is to be 
taught as well as in the teaching methods. This will add a new margin to 
the learning capacities of the student, giving him the opportunity of 
learning more. 
The teaching of physics could be posed as an illustration of this 
methodology. First of all, it should be made clear that a distinction is 
made between the science taught to the average student and that taught to 
the student becoming a specialist in physics. This last should learn the 
higher mathematics together with the sophisticated techniques of doing 
physics. This should not be the case with the average student learning the 
cultural dimensions of physics. The average student will learn a rigorously 
derived synthesis of concepts regarding the nature and the functioning of 
the physical world as these ideas have emerged from the research in physics. 
The teaching of these ideas will cover the means by which the physicist 
acquires knowledge and by which he has achieved his marvelous scientific 
construction. The student should be taught also the principles of physics 
and a brief but scrupulous tracing of the course of its historical evolution. 
Ortega claims that it is possible to simplify and synthetize the "quin-
tessence" of science without sacrifice of its quality. His point is that 
making the basic ideas of a science be understood by the average student 
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does not necessarily require formal training with the science, or familiarity 
with its techniques. The principles, methods of procedure, and end results 
of any science could be understood if well simplified and synthetized by 
competent educators. 
Ortega's idea of concentration and consolidation of knowledge may not 
be as simple as he suggests. Nonetheless, it is a reality that more must be 
done with the problem of the accumulation of knowledge and the simplification 
of its teaching and learning. Unless some technique is invented to cope 
with its exuberant growth, the same science and knowledge so eagerly sought 
by man as a means of power and dominion over the world will become more and 
more a problem than a solution. Besides, if this endeavor for the concen-
tration and accumulation of knowledge is not accomplished, it seems that 
only a few men would be knowledgeable of the basic realities of the world we 
live in. These men would be the scientists that devote their lives to 
research. To lessen this, trying to make the knowledge of the sciences 
more accessible to the average student, Ortega suggests his "thorough 
rationalization of the methods of instruction, from the primary grades to 
the university."3' This would pave the way to the segregating of the 
cultural elements of science so that these may be made "assimilable."38 
We think that to some extent Ortega is perhaps stressinq too much the 
intellectual dimension of education. Such a stress of this element could 
sometimes lead to an overemphasis on the learning of facts and in memori-
zation without true understanding. Possibly to counterbalance this 
impression, Ortega mentioned his interest in the "humanization" of knowledge. 
Part of this humanization would be his idea of making the different sciences 
accessible, through the university, to the average student. The end result 
of this humanization would be the development of a man with a "symmetrical 
culture." 
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In developing a curriculum following the idea of economy of education, 
two criteria should be followed: 
(1) Pick up that curriculum which may be necessary for 
the student's life. Life and its requirements 
should be the criterion guiding the limitations 
imposed on the curriculum. 
(2) After the first pruning, what remains as conceived 
strictly necessary, should be further reduced to 
what the average student can truly learn with 
thoroughness and understanding.4^ 
In sum, according to the principle of "economy of education," only so 
much should be taught that the student can truly understand and learn and 
that will actually be necessary for his life's needs. 
Regarding the provision of this cultural package to the student, 
Ernest Becker says that in Ortega the university was viewed as a "revitalized 
institution" which would serve the students and mass society, helping them 
with the encounter with life and with the problems of the age. Knowledge, 
according to Becker, is not knowledge if it "stops" man "with its depth and 
no 
breadth. What is important in this cultural package provided by the 
university is that it should serve man's life and provide man with that 
43 knowledge which he can use "for his own active benefit in the world."H 
According to Becker, it is true that the "net" should be thrown wide 
in order to try to take the measure of all things, but that measure should 
be man, in this case, the average student. Becker says that the problem of 
knowledge is pragmatic and qualitative, having nothing to do with how much 
knowledge is available or what the professors want to propagate. What is 
important here is a methodology geared in the sense that the student's 
capacity to learn would be the measure and the guide for what he would 
assimilate. And, together with this, a curriculum should be tailored so as 
to make the student be at the "height of the times." How can this be 
accomplished? 
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The Faculty of Culture 
According to Ortega, the way the university can give an integral view 
of reality to the good average student is through a "Faculty of Culture" 
placed at the heart of the University. This Faculty should prepare a cur-
riculum according to the basic ideas and beliefs of the time, those "vital" 
ideas and beliefs by which the age "lives" and which constitute the "very 
foundations" of the way of life and "the repertory of our active convic-
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tions" regarding an idea of the world, of ourselves and of our fellow 
creatures. This system of ideas and beliefs should be a "live" system 
representing "the superior level of the age . . . essentially characteristic 
of its times, and this system is the culture of the age."45 What is 
important to living a plentiful and more meaningful life is to live according 
to this "superior level" of the age. Living at a lower level condemns one 
to live on "archaic" ideas and "drossy residues" of other times, which lead 
to a lower life, more difficult and unrefined, lacking "truth," "richness" 
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and "acumen." Thus, a life without the tools consisting of the basic system 
of ideas and beliefs of the times is a "crippled" life; it is also "wrecked" 
and even "false." And, as was said above, this is a serious problem of our 
times because our average man in uncultured, staying "below" his times and 
the demands of his epoch on him. This leads to a serious situation of 
falsification of life. If man does not know which are the vital notions, 
problems, and solutions of his time, he cannot know what is his proper place 
in society, and even before his own self-image. This means that he will live 
on "subterfuges," deceiving himself with simple and arbitrary ideas of the 
world, which do not coincide with reality. Thus, the university should teach 
the student the basic elements of the culture of the time. It should reveal 
to him "that gigantic world of today in which the life of the individual must 
96 
be articulated, if it is to be authentic." 
The Faculty of Culture and General Knowledge 
The Faculty of Culture would develop and provide, according to Becker's 
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interpretation of Ortega, "a true synthesis of knowledge." The core of 
the curriculum of this Faculty would be as follows-
1) The physical scheme of the world (Physics). 
2) The fundamental themes of organic life (Biology). 
3) The historical process of the human species (History). 
4) The structure and functioning of social life (Sociology). 
5) The plan of the universe (Philosophy). 
Besides Becker, two other American writers have seen some positive 
constituent elements of this Ortegan idea of a curriculum for general 
knowledge. 
Sidney Hook, said that even though some educators may disagree with 
Ortega's views, 
"he gives some sharp suggestions on the ta i lor ing of 
curricula to f i t the capabilit ies of the student— 
what the university should be to equip the ordinary 
student to be a cultured person and a good member of 
a profession,"49 
Robert Corngan, referring to Orteqa's curriculum and to his idea of 
the Faculty of Culture, says that, 
"Ortega's main objective is to break down our pigeon-
hole type of education by having knowledge selected, 
arranged, and related to the t ru ly human problems which 
confront modern man. He wants an intercultural education 
which takes the student beyond national boundaries and 
seeks a human unity as i t s common denominator. He thwarts 
man's tendency to compare, l i m i t , and di f ferent iate, and 
substitute a g i f t for integration, synthesis, and 
systematization of knowledge. In the process he shows us 
how to digest, interpret, and c lar i fy the great minds of 
the past. Ortega's blueprint for combining and at the 
same time separating specialized and general education may 
well be his greatest contribution to pedagogy."50 
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Regarding this curriculum, we agree with Sidney Hook and Robert Corrigan 
that it contains positive and interesting elements. Nonetheless, it can also 
be criticized. It can be said that it is incomplete for it lacks the 
artistic element: literature, music, painting, and the disciplines related 
to art. And this is surprising in an educator belonging to a "sensual" and 
"impressionistic" culture like that of Spain. 
The Faculty of Culture, the Transmission of Knowledge, and the 
Preparation of ProfessionaTT 
The transmission of knowledge ranks as one of the fundamentals in 
Ortega's mission of the university, for it helps in the development of a 
cultured Individual. This individual will be capable of living a H f e of 
quality 1f he 1s capable of keepinq himself abreast of time. At this point 
we confront a puzzle. How would this man keep himself abreast of the time 
when the overproduction of knowledge, as has been discussed, 1s so over-
whelming? 
This Ortega does not explain. He is perhaps expecting this man to make 
his own synthesis of knowledge and his own application of the principle of 
the economy of knowledge. But to rely on this would be hardly no more than 
wishful thinking. We know that to create such a synthesis of knowledge, 
the concurrence of a competent team of experts working across disciplines is 
necessary. The only chance to go on educating the university students is to 
provide them with continuing education. One big problem here is that our 
university, as it is structured, does not have the material resources to go 
on educating Its adult population. At the same time, this population would 
not have either the money or the time to put in for this continuous enlighten-
ment. And even if they had time and money, how about motivation? These are 
puzzles that Ortega does not discuss 1n his analysis of the education of the 
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ordinary student and man. He discusses, instead, the creation of pro-
fessionals by the university. For him, the development of a good professional 
should also be one of the basic aims of the university. According to 
Ortega, the European university has been concerned basically with the 
teaching of learned professions and with scientific research, together with 
the preparation of future investigators. This combination of science and 
professionalism seems to present a problem in the way these tasks have been 
conceived by the university; i.e., professionalism and science have been 
"joined," "fused," together. This is considered a mistake, because a doctor, 
a lawyer, or a pharmacist, is not a scientist, neither is the study of 
medicine or law an activity of making sc-.ence. What the profession does is 
to "borrow from science" what it needs from its disciplines for its practical 
aims. In so doing, the members of the different professions are not making 
science, but using what the scientist has found in his research. So the 
professional's aim is "applying solutions" to some specific problems in his 
area of concern. The scientist, on the contrary, is more concerned with the 
"cultivation of the problematic and doubtful" and with an urge to work the 
problematic dimension of the puzzles he confronts, rather than having 
solutions. 
Ortega says that "In its proper and authentic sense, science is 
exclusively investigation: the setting up of problems, working at them, and 
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arriving at their solution." 
The point that is presented here is that the traditional "fusing" 
together in the European university of professionalism and science is harming 
the full development of both science and profession; therefore, "the teaching 
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of the professions and the search for truth must be separated." The 
confusion of one with another is viewed therefore as an "impediment" to 
science and to the development of good professionals. 
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Ortega grants that the apprenticeship of some professions demands as 
an important element the mastery of much of the systematized content of 
diverse sciences. But it should be distinguished that this content "is the 
end result of investigation, and not the investigation itself." 4 A physician, 
for instance, does not need to go beyond his learning to effect cures and 
become a physiologist. What he needs to know is only the system of 
physiology current in his day. The same goes for instance with the teacher 
of mathematics or science; he does not necessarily need to be a mathematician, 
or a chemist, or physicist to be a good teacher. For Ortega, "teaching aims 
only to convey what has been created, to digest it and to induce learners 
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to digest it."0 
To some extent, Ortega is applying here the principle of "scarcity" 
which, as we know, regulates that of "economy of learning." He is suggesting 
that there is a limitation in the learning capacities of the professional and 
in the application of learned skills. The professional cannot therefore be a 
good professional and a scientist altogether. So he should make up his mind 
and "limit" himself to be a good professional if that is what he wants; "we 
can achieve things only by concentrating our energy: by limiting ourselves."56 
So, if a man has the calling to be a physician, he should concentrate on that 
and not try to "dabble with science" because he will lose a good chance of 
being a good professional while making mediocre science. In this sense, for 
Ortega, the trend of a university dominated by inquiry has been "disastrous." 
This has, in the case of the professional, "deflected attention from the 
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problem of how best to train future professionals for their professions." 
This should not be the case and the university should be more careful in the 
development of its professionals. For this purpose it could help the 
development of "what the ideal type (of a professional) should be for our 
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time." Ortega is suggesting that the development of good professionals 
should be meticulously arranged and should not, as_it is done today, "be 
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entrusted largely to providence." For this purpose professionals should 
be cultured. As part of this idea, it is rejected here the idea of a 
professionalism and a specialism that reduces the idea of the "whole man" 
to a stump. A man learned in one thing and fundamentally ignorant of all 
others, presents an "astounding" and "brutal" "spectacle"; Ortega thinks 
that professionalism and specialism, through insufficient counter-balancing, 
have smashed the modern man to pieces. That is why it is so important, as 
a remedy for this "fragmentation" whereby the life of a person seems to 
become determined by his profession, to teach the basic culture of the time 
to the ordinary student and professional. 
The University Should Be Also Science 
We have seen that the university should be culture and profession. 
But it should be something in addition: it should be science because the 
higher learning draws its sustenance and grows from science. The university, 
though distinct from science, is inseparable from it. And it is inseparable 
to the extent that it represents the "souV'cf the institution. Without 
science to animate its institutional life, culture and the professions would 
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be "overtaken by the creeping paralysis of scholasticism"; it is from 
science where culture and professionalism nourish. 
There is still another point that should be made clear. This is how 
the university should keep in contact with current social change. Ortega 
seemed to be aware that to be at the "height of the times" represented 
knowing and participating in the social changes of the present. This made 
him say that the university should be opened to the whole reality of its 
time and be located in the "midst of real life." Accordingly, the university 
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must participate in the affairs and daily life of the people. In so doing, 
the university should serve as a counterbalance to the power exerted today, 
for instance, by the press in the collective life of society. For Ortega, 
the press represents that spiritual force which necessarily concerns itself 
with current affairs. It has devolved into that force that guides and 
nourishes the public soul. But in doing this, the "periodicals" and 
"dailies" have put upside down the image of the world in the sense that 
importance is not given to the fundamental issues and problems of social 
life. What stands out as important in the pages of newspapers and magazines 
is the kind of "success" that brings notoriety. Some of the reasons for the 
failure of the press to exert a serious and positive influence on public 
life are, according to Ortega: the influence of money, also the uncultured 
nature of many journalists who are frequently "frustrated pseudo-intellectuals." 
The point stressed here is that the press represents one of society's basic 
"spiritual powers." The ancient spiritual powers governing the current 
affairs, like was the case with the church and state, have disappeared. 
Such being the case, much of public life has devolved into the hands of the 
press, newspapers and the mass media in qeneral, which today represents that 
spiritual force concerned with current affairs. Should contemporary man 
leave to the press the responsibility for nourishing and guiding the public 
opinion? Ortega opposes this possibility. He does not see any justification 
for leaving in the hands of the journalist, who many times in an "uncultured 
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man," such an important task. So, the university should intervene to put 
things in their proper place. This means that it should intervene in the 
current affairs in which it should treat the great themes of the day from a 
cultural, a professional, and a scientific point of view. This will help to 
assert the university as a major "spiritual power" and as "an uplifting 
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principle 1n the history of the western world." Now, how should this 
Intervention Into current affairs be fulfilled? Regarding this point, 
Ortega poses an example which could Illustrate this intervention. He says 
that It is Incredible that, for Instance, in Spain 1n the face of a current 
problem like that of foreign exchange, the university has not come forward 
to teach a serious course 1n the matter. So, the university should be on 
the alert regarding which are the basic and important issues of the moment 
and prepare courses explaining them. Nonetheless, something should be added 
to this, More Important than the current affairs, many times guided by 
fashion, 1s to be aware and knowledgeable of the current basic ideas of 
science, philosophy, art, education, etc., so as to prepare courses giving 
a proper perspective of their meaning and entailment. If this fundamental 
analysis of the contemporary ideas of science and of other basic cultural 
disciplines 1s not accomplished, and we tend to give too much weight to the 
discussion and analysis of the current opinions and issues, the university 
could run the risk of sometimes becoming superficial. To Illustrate such a 
peril, let us use an example taken from Bertrand Russell's book, Unpopular 
Essays; 1t is true that the situation presented is not the same, but 1t 1s 
analogical. In his book, Russell refers to the writer willing to be "up to 
date" 1n his topics. According to Russell, this kind of writer writes for 
the moment and not for all times; next year, for Instance, he will have 
adopted the new fashion in opinions, no matter which they are. The point 
here is that this kind of Interest 1n the current affairs of life, 1f 
stressed too much, could eventually lead to the formation of a man with no 
wish "to think better thoughts than his neighbors or to say things showing 
more Insight, or to have emotions which are not those of some fashionable 
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So, we cannot keep the university away from gettinq into the current 
affairs of life but, while doing it, we cannot forqet the compromise of 
higher learning with the basic dealinqs with science and its correlate 
disciplines. 
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NOTES - CHAPTER IV 
Biologia y Pedagogia, Obras Completas, Vol. II, p. 281. 
2Ibid., p. 283. Ortega introduces in this text a comment regarding the 
genius of Rousseau for advancing the pedagogical ideas with his concept of 
spontaneity, but he rejects Rouss-au's notion of negative education. On the 
contrary, education should be "positive"; it is important to intervene in the 
child's spontaneity so that this really can be used as a pedagogical method, 
but this intervention should lean in the child's spontaneity and life; 
psychology should come to the aid of education for this purpose. Ibid, 
p. 283. 
30rtega distinguishes between "to desire" and "to want." For him, the 
"desire" recognizes no limits—this is the child's case: he does not know 
what can be had or not; experience has not taught him yet. In the case of 
"to want," the adult looks to achieve that which experience shows him as 
attainable. 
4Ibid., p. 290. 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid., p. 299. 
'Ibid., p. 298. 
8Ibid. At this point Ortega recognizes Froebel's talent for introducing 
games as part of the educational methodology. Nonetheless, a critique of 
Froebel is also introduced because, according to our author, Froebel "uses 
the games as a mechanism to form the adult in the child." 
g 
Here Ortega seems to be following Hegel's idea that in everything alive 
"superation implies a negation"; but he adds that to negate or deny something 
implies its conservation; Ortega uses this Hegelian notion to explain, 
throughout his work, his notion of progress; see ibid., p. 299. 
10Ibid., p. 302. At this point, Ortega says that thp triumph of some of 
the ideas of socialism over the capitalistic system implies the "taking away 
from the utilitarian type of man the ideas and sentiments that, representative 
of his conception of life, have lasted for about two centuries." Accordinq 
to this, we will later on in the evolution of society have a situation where, 
"the social power will pass from the hands of the homo economicus or 
utilitarian man, to the hands of another type of man, anti-economical and 
anti-utilitarian . . . a vitalistic type to whom living is not going after 
some material gains but, on the contrary, it implies giving (refer to a 
footnote in page 302 of ibid.). 
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Ibid., p. 302. Ortega, to illustrate his point, compares the per-
ception that the farmer and the hunter have for the countryside. The farmer, 
contrary to general opinion—for being focused in his utilitarian perspective 
of the country—will not know the country's environs as well as the hunter. 
He will not be, for instance, very knowledqeable of the sounds of the birds 
and the different color tones of the landscape, etc. On the contrary, each 
of these things would be recognized better by the hunter in all their rich-
ness and minute details. It is true that some concrete details of the 
countryside will be better known and economically exploited by the farmer, 
but, in general, the hunter will have before him a richer and broader world 
before his eyes, than the farmer. 
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190rtega says that it is true that there are other activities full of 
falsity, as is the case with justice; but what is considered as an intolerable 
abuse in the courts, i.e., that justice is not done, is in the case of teach-
ing "almost the norm." 
20Ibid., p. 23. 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid., p. 24. This may seem an interesting claim regarding the level 
of education of contemporary man. Nonetheless, one cannot help asking if 
this may be a proven fact and how much research Ortega analyzed to make such 
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ment of science. So, education should come to the rescue of science. 
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educated. According to Ortega, today's scientist should be taught to get 
rid of some of the residues that he maintains from last century's idea of 
science. He should also relinquish his "feudal violence," "eqotlsm" and 
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CONCLUSIONS AND EVALUATION 
In this essay, I have tried to make an analysis and exposition of 
Ortega's basic educational thought. From the analysis of aletheia in 
chapter one, we saw the Ortegean interpretation of truth as "discovery" and 
as a personal endeavor to which the student should be personally committed. 
Ortega's point is that truth cannot be taught, so its search is a personal 
engagement of each person. Along this line, the school should not be 
considered as the place where one learns the truth or what is good or bad 
in the sense of providing right answers or attitudes to confront life. 
This should become a personal commitment of each individual willirg to be 
free and self-directed. 
Though this may seem an interesting idea, it lacks some clarity in 
its presentation by Ortega. He does not mention, for instance, how to 
insert it in the curriculum. We know that, for instance, such an idea could 
be good in the curriculum of the social sciences, where the student could 
be exposed to different ideas or "truths" so that he analyzes and interprets 
them by himself. In this way he could have a chance of "qlidinq" by himself 
toward the ''feet of a new truth," as Ortega says However, this kind of 
analysis may not be as proper in the teaching, let's say, of mathematics. 
Another limitation of Ortega's idea is that it does not analyze the way the 
teacher's attitudes, the curriculum, and the methods used for teaching in 
the classroom, could influence the "truths" found and discussed in school. 
Ortega does not seem to be aware of this problem, at least he does not 
discuss it. He does not analyze the possibility of a predetermination of 
knowledge whereby what is "discovered" could become dependent on the edu-
cational setting in which the student is placed. This is not an easy puzzle 
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to be dealt with and places one important problem in today's social studies. 
But we have to be aware of it and pose it to educators as one of the puzzles 
1n their search for objectivity 1n teaching and learning. If we are not 
aware of this possible determination of knowledge, we would not make the 
student aware that the kind of truth sought, the methods used 1n its search, 
and the attitude of the researcher toward what 1s sought, could influence 
the final outcome of the "truth" found. In this way, elements that usually 
are considered facilitators to the student in the learning process, like 
the teacher, the classroom, and the curriculum, could actually inhibit or 
bias the search for truth. 
Chapter two holds again the idea of truth but, this time, as related 
to the concept of human life. This concept, as was analyzed, 1s the being 
where all other reality "assumes meaning and structure." Ortega Insists 
1n the personal and individual element of human life. He says that life 1s 
"biographical" and urges the Individual to be responsible for his "biography" 
and actions. So, a H f e lived with self-awareness should be responsible 
and as much self-directed as possible. This self-direction, in Its turn, 
can be important in the individual's self-realization which, 1n Ortega, is 
accomplished if man follows his project of being or vocation. 
Self-realization in school would be strongly represented by the career, 
profession, or studies, that may better suit the student's personal 
preferences and strengths. Ortega conceives that education should be a 
means of helping man to realize his vocation or preferred project of life. 
So, Instead of imposing on the student in search for a profession, certain 
knowledge and the learning of certain skills, the school should suggest, 
guide, and orient him, so that he can make his own free choice. 
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I f we evaluate this idea of self-real izat ion as related to vocation, 
we f ind some strong as well as some weak points in i t . The positive element 
is the need recognized here for working from the student's preferences and 
strengths. To th i s , many educators would agree. The point would be to see 
how they agree or d i f fer in their def in i t ion and understanding of what the 
student's preferences and strengths are, and to what aim these should be 
directed. I t is known that the Platonic and Hegelian educator v/ould conceive, 
for instance, the chi ld 's realization in an idea of the State. So, education 
should serve society's ends rather than the individual 's. On the contrary, 
an educator following the existential outlook of a Soren Kierkegaard, a Jean 
Paul Sartre, or of an Albert Camus, would prefer centennq his attention more 
in the realization of the individual than in the interest of the State or in 
what society may impose on him. Ortega, as i t already has been said, leaned 
toward a concept of education close, to a certain extent, to the one held by 
these thinkers. And such a conception was evident in the cr i t ic ism that, as 
we saw in the th i rd chapter, he made of Kershensteiner's concept of education. 
Nonetheless, there are some weak points in Ortega's idea of self-
realization through the fu l f i l lment of one's project of being in a profession. 
This is that even i f a l l the students could know and follow their professional 
and career interests, only a few members of society could achieve their 
sel f - real izat ion. So, even with the most ideal conditions in our schooling 
system, the ideal of self-real izat ion and of a free man and society would 
s t i l l be a far-of f idea. Some chanqes would s t i l l be necessary in the struc-
ture of society to make i t possible for the school to real ly become—at least 
in a larger scale—a more effective means of social change. I t would also 
need some re-structuring so as to become a more effective tool for individual 
sel f - real izat ion. 
Ill 
It has to be mentioned that in Ortega the realization of the individual 
does not imply the negation of the good society. Ortega views as important 
establishing a well-balanced interrelationship between the individual and 
society. Even though he does not state it clearly—as happens many times in 
his thought—he seemed to understand the necessity of havinq an enlightened 
community so as to produce an enlightened individual. That is why he felt 
committed toward the education of Spam and thought of the Spanish problem 
as a pedagogical one which he had to help solve. As we explained already in 
chapter three, he foresaw the acquisition of the European culture as part of 
the solution to the Spanish problem. This led him to seek the "Europeani-
zation" of Spain: "Spain is the problem and Europe is the solution," said 
Ortega. One basic element of the problem was the absence of modern ideas in 
Spain from the sciences and mathematics, and from philosophy. For Ortega, 
Europe could furnish these ideas. So, Spain had to open its doors to the 
European cultural influence and inteqrate herself to the European community. 
According to Ortega, the national beliefs, on which rested the Spanish 
character and culture, had to be rejuvenated and, if necessary, substituted 
by new European ideas. This demanded a Spam integrated to the cultural 
European community, or to a European united states, as he labeled this 
4. 2 
community. 
This Europeanization of Spain would give the Spanish man the opportunity 
for combining his "sensuous" and "impressionistic" culture with the intel-
lectual attitude matrix of the European one. So, Ortega wants to create a 
more sophisticated and intellectual cultural medium for the Spanish man. 
And he dedicates all his life to this task. He wanted, as Ernest Becker 
interprets in Beyond Alienation, to establish "a locus of mass education, 
without the great danger of mass education." 
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Robert McClintock, too, says that Ortega's educational influence in 
Spain was decisive in creating a true intellectual atmosphere. An important 
instance of this atmosphere was the School of Madrid: "one of the more solid 
4 
centers of contemporary thought." Another way by which Ortega tried to 
influence and solve the pedagogical problem of Spain was with the establish-
ment of a set of pedagogical ideas proper, as we discussed in qeneral 
throughout the thesis and, in particular, in chapter four. These pedagogical 
ideas could be divided into three main stages. The first one represents an _ 
idealistic and social conception of education. Ortega is influenced here by 
the philosophical thought of Neo-Kantism and by the pedagogical ideas of his 
German teachers, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. When he wrote "La Pedagogia 
Social como Programa Politico" ("Social Pedagogy as a Political Program") 
(1910), he had shortly arrived from Germany, where he spent from 1905-07 
conducting post-doctoral studies. In "La Pedagogia Social'' we see some of 
the elements of this idealistic pedagogical thought. Some of the ideas in 
this writing are oriented also along the ideology of socialism. Accordingly, 
Ortega defends here the right of the workers to be educated and the notion 
that we all should become "laborers of culture." Ortega also, following the 
lines of the German idealistic thought, conceived that education "forms the 
5 
man from humanity." This represents subsuming the individual into the 
universal, the person into the idea of humanity and of culture. 
The second stage of Orteqa's pedagogical thought could be labeled as 
"vitalistic." This is basically stated in his Biologia y Pedagogia (Biology 
and Pedagogy) (1920). In this book, as we saw in chapter four, education— 
particularly elementary education—should primarily pay attention and guide 
the child's primary, spontaneous, and creative life. The teaching of culture 
and civilization would be, later on, the responsibility of secondary and 
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higher education. Accordingly, it would be the role of secondary and higher 
education to deal with the formation of the good citizen, and should also 
help the student in the development of some basic technical skills, and with 
the teaching of general, cultural knowledqe. So, according to this thought, 
elementary or primary education would take care of the child's creative life 
or the natura naturans of the child, while secondary and hiqher education 
would take care of the natura naturata or, that knowledge established already 
as cultural and technical knowledge in the social medium. 
At this point of analysis, it would be helpful to point out that the 
exposition of this idea of elementary education has several weak points. 
Ortega, for instance, fails to distinguish between early childhood education 
and the rest of the primary education, and what age should constitute the 
transition between the primary and the secondary education. These dis-
tinctions are of fundamental importance. They will be basic in determining 
changes in the curriculum, in methods of teaching, and in the teacher's 
attitudes, etc. The curriculum and material used in the classroom would 
change drastically, depending upon whether we are teaching, for instance, a 
child in kindergarten or a child in first or second grade. 
The stage of ratio-vitalism represents the third moment of Ortega's 
educational thought. This moment embraces the two previous stages, sur-
passing them at the same time. In the ratio-vitalistic stage, an important 
element is added to education which was lacking in the previous two stages. 
This is the personal and intentional element in the educational process. 
Now, education would be guided so that it understands and follows the point 
of view of the student. 
In the first stage, we had the point of view of the social engineer 
who wants to achieve a well-ordered and good society through well-directed 
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educational planning. In the second stage, Ortega tried to go into the 
child's spontaneous life to guide and educate it so as to produce the best 
possible creative individual and citizen. Now, Ortega will deal with the 
problem of an education for self-realization and for freedom. He will also 
analyze more concrete problems on how the student relates to knowledge and 
to studying; also, what should be the mission of the university, together 
with what places the study of culture, professionalism, and science should 
have in this "mission." I find that it is in this kind of analysis together 
with, for instance, the analysis regarding the place of the student in the 
university, where Ortega's pedagogical thought is still at the "height of 
the times." This does not necessarily imply that his suggestions are the 
best or that these should be followed. Nonetheless, it furnishes an oppor-
tunity to discuss enthusiastic and appealing educational problems for which, 
many times, no one would have a final solution. 
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FOOTNOTES 
This could be impor tan t when one i s dea l i ng w i t h the study o f 
minority groups. The highly ethnocentric researcher, instead of going after 
an objective analysis and evaluation of the object of research, could only 
be looking for "proof" whereby to validate his biased views. 
2 
This thought, which started as early as 1906 in "Pidiendo una 
Bibl iot ica" ("Demanding a Library"), went on maturing unt i l 1930,'wRen Ortega 
wrote his Meditacion de Europa (Meditation of Europe). In this book, he 
suggested that Europe should follow the example of the United States and 
become an economical unit. Nonetheless, this economical unit should keep i ts 
cultural pluralism which, for Ortega, represents the real cultural strength 
of Europe; he commands thus "unity in variety." 
3Becker, Ernest, Beyond Alienation, p. 284. 
4McClintock, Robert, Man and His Circumstances, Ortega as Educator, 
p. 124. ' 
5 
"Jose Ortega y Gasset," Diccionario de Pedagogia, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, 
Ed. Losada, S.A. (Buenos Aires, 1960), p. 284. (my translat ion). 
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